

İSLÂH (A.), reform, reformism.

I.—THE ARAB WORLD

In modern Arabic, the term *islâh* is used for "reform" (cf.: *RALA*, xxi (1386/1966), 351, no. 15) in the general sense: in contemporary Islamic literature it denotes more specifically orthodox reformism of the type that emerges in the doctrinal teachings of Muḥammad 'Abduh, in the writings of Rashīd Riḍā, and in the numerous Muslim authors who are influenced by these two masters and, like them, consider themselves disciples of the Salafiyya (see below). *Islâh* will be examined under the following general headings: A. Historical; B. Fundamental principles; C. The principal doctrinal positions; D. *Islâh* in the contemporary Arab world.

A.—HISTORICAL.—I.—Background.—The idea of *islâh*, so widespread in modern Islamic culture, is also very common in the vocabulary of the Qur'ân, where the radicals *ṣ-l-ḥ* cover a very wide semantic field. Amongst the derivatives of this root employed in the Qur'ân are: a) The verb *aṣlaḥa* and the corresponding infinitive, *islâḥ*, used sometimes in the sense of "to work towards peace (*ṣulḥ*)", "to bring about harmony", "to urge people to be reconciled with one another" and "to agree" (cf. II, 228, IV, 35, 114, XLIX, 9, 10), and at others in the sense of "to perform a pious act (*'amal ṣāliḥ*)", "to perform a virtuous act (*ṣalâḥ*)", "to behave like a holy man (*ṣāliḥ*, plur. *ṣāliḥūn/ṣāliḥāt*)" (cf. II, 220, IV, 128, VII, 56, 85, 142, XI, 46, 90); b) The substantive *muṣliḥ*, plur. *muṣliḥūn*: those who perform pious acts, who are saintly in spirit, who preach peace and harmony, who are concerned with the moral perfection of their neighbours, and strive to make men better. It is precisely in this sense that the modern Muslim reformists can be defined, reformists who proudly claim the title of *muṣliḥūn*, upon which Revelation confers a certain prestige (cf. Qur'ân, VII, 170, XI, 117, XXVIII, 19) The adherents of *islâh* consider themselves in the direct line of the reformer-prophets whose lives are quoted as examples in the Qur'ân (cf. especially *sūras* VII, X, XI, XX); but they claim to be influenced above all by the example of the mission of the Prophet Muḥammad, whom they consider to be the Reformer par excellence (cf. *al-Shihâb*, May 1939, 183: *Muḥammad, al-muṣliḥ al-a'ṣam*). Thus *islâh* is deeply rooted in the basic soil of Islam, and cannot therefore be viewed solely in relation to the intellectual trends that appeared in the Muslim world at the beginning of the modern period.

2.—The historical continuity of *islâh*.—In so far as it is on the one hand an individual or collective effort to define Islam solely in relation to its authentic sources (i.e., the Qur'ân and the *Sunna* [q.v.] of the Prophet) and on the other an attempt to work towards a situation in which the lives of Muslims, in personal and social terms, really would conform to the norms and values of their religion, *islâh* is a permanent feature in the religious and cultural history of Islam. This two-fold approach characterizing *islâh* is quite justified from a Qur'anic point of view. For a) Islam is simply that which Revelation contains, as it is transmitted and explained by the Prophet (see below: *The return to first principles*). b) To work for the Good, and aspire to improve (*aṣlaḥ*), is simply to attempt to restore Islamic values in modern Muslim society. From this point of view, *islâh* can be seen as an intellectual, and frequently practical, response to the injunction of "commanding what is good and prohibiting what is evil" (see on this subject the two fundamental

references, Qur'ân III, 104, 110). This canonical obligation (*farḍ, farīḍa*)—a major obligation on the head of the Community (*imâm*)—is constantly invoked by the reformers, both as a justification for their action, and as an appeal to the faithful, who are also bound, each according to his social standing and means, to play his part in "commanding the good". (On this important question of Muslim ethics see the classic text of al-Ghazālī in *Iḥyâ' 'ulūm al-dīn* chap.: *Kitâb al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar*, trans. L. Bercher, *De l'obligation d'ordonner le Bien et d'interdire le Mal selon al-Ghazālī*, in *IBLA*, 1st and 3rd trim. 1955; the neo-Hanbalite doctrine (so illuminating for reformist teaching) in H. Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines... d'Ibn Taymiyya*, 601-5; the position of Muḥ. 'Abduh in: *Risâlat al-tawḥīd*, 113 (Fr. trans., 121), and *Tafsīr al-Manâr*, ix, 36; a complete account of the question by Rashīd Riḍā: *ibid.* iv, 25-47 on *sūra* III, 104, and 57-64, on *sūra* III, 110; L. Gardet, *Dieu et la destinée de l'homme*, Paris 1967, 445 ff.).

Like all Muslims who cherish an ideal of the pious and virtuous life (*ṣalâḥ*), the reformists like to refer to the many Qur'anic verses which praise "those who do works of *islâḥ*" (VI, 42, VII, 170, XXVIII, 19) and particularly to XI, 90, which they hold to be the perfect motto of Muslim reformism: "O mon peuple! ... Mon unique désir est de vous rendre meilleurs" (trans. Savary)—"Je ne veux que réformer" (trans. Blachère)—"I desire only to set things right." (trans. Arberry). These scriptural statements are illustrated by the tradition that the Prophet intimated that Islam would need to be revitalized periodically and that in each century Providence would raise up men capable of accomplishing this necessary mission of moral and religious regeneration. (On this tradition, cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 204 b: "At the end...").

The Community has never lacked men willing to assume precisely this prophetic mission. In its early stages and also in its later developments, *islâh* has been identified with the service of the *Sunna*, which is thought to provide the best model for the Islamic way of life (cf. Qur'ân, XXXIII, 21), as well as supplying the essential elements which lie at the base of the earliest orthodoxy of Islam. The Qur'ân is without doubt the most important point of reference for modern *islâh*; yet, in its earliest manifestations, it appears to be above all the expression of a total allegiance to the Prophet's Tradition. This active, sometimes militant, allegiance is best expressed in its defence of the *Sunna* against "blameworthy innovations" (*bida'* [q.v.]) which are judged incompatible with the objective facts of the Book, the unquestionable teachings of the Prophet, and the testimony of the "pious forefathers" (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*). Upholders of strict primitive orthodoxy were particularly aware of the increase of *bida'*: a) at the dogmatic level: cf. the speculation nurtured by the dawning rationalist theology (*kalâm* [q.v.]); Qur'anic exegesis of Bāṭinī tendency; the theses of extremist Shī'ism; and b) in the sphere of worship: asceticism, excessive piety, paraliturgical practices inspired by Sūfism (*ṣawwuf* [q.v.]), all of which they believed indicated a spirit of exaggeration (*ghulū*) contrary to the essence of Islamic spirituality. Such innovations were held to be blameworthy because they were looked upon as sources of error and seeds of heresy; they therefore seemed to constitute a serious threat to the confessional unity and moral and political cohesion of the *Umma*.

The historical development of *islâh* must, it seems,

be related to that new spirit which gave rise to *bid'at* throughout the cultural evolution of the Community. The following are a few milestones:—1. The political and moral crisis following the battles of Šiffin (37/657 [q.v.]) and Nahrawan (38/658 [q.v.]) engendered ardent political and religious polemics between the *Khawāridj* [q.v.] and the *Shi'a* [q.v.] on the one hand and the supporters of the established authority on the other. In this climate of schism the doctrinal tendencies which classical Sunnism decried as heretical to a greater or lesser extent began to grow (cf. al-Šahrastānī, *Milal*, i, 27). The period of the Prophet's companions was hardly over (ca. 90/708) when the theologico-philosophical speculations which were to disturb the Muslim conscience for many years began to appear.—2. At the end of the 1st/7th century, the general evolution of the Muslim community was sufficiently advanced for the unity of faith and monolithic convictions of the first decades to be replaced by a diversity of intellectual and religious attitudes towards the *ḵur'ānic* revelation and the problems posed by it (predestination and free will, the problem of evil, the attributes of God, the nature of the *Ḵur'ān*, etc.). Despite its dominant position (at least in theory), official Sunnism was neither dynamic nor homogeneous enough to condition effectively the moral and religious behaviour of the new generations. Many factors (especially socio-cultural and political ones) gradually weakened the religious and cultural impact of the *Sunna*, whose sociological base was anyway being diluted among the diverse populations of the vast empire. It is worth noting in this respect the geographical dispersion and gradual extinction of the main witnesses of primitive Islam, those who were later called the "pious forefathers". These were essentially the Prophet's Companions (*ṣaḥāba*) and the most eminent of their immediate successors (*ṭābi'ūn*).—3. Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (died 110/728 [q.v.]) marks the end of the *Sunna*'s first era, before the spread of the great controversies which were to divide the Muslims (in the field of *ḵur'ānic* exegesis, and as a result of a free philosophical enquiry on the revealed Book). The famous break between al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā (d. 131/748 [q.v.]) prefigures the doctrinal disputes and later conflicts which resulted above all in the creation of a Traditional Party (*ahl al-sunna*), the "pious forefathers" (*ṭā'ifat al-salaf*), as a reaction against the new sects and tendencies (*Shi'a*, *Khawāridj*, *Djahmiyya*, *Mu'tazila*, etc.) which were judged more or less heretical (cf. H. Laoust, *Schismes*, 84 ff.).—4. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855 [q.v.]) represents a strongly entrenched Sunnism ready to fight the new schools of thought which questioned the dogma of the primitive orthodoxy (cf. his *Radd 'ala 'l-xanādika wa 'l-djahmiyya*).

The desire to refute the errors of their century, to combat those sects believed to have introduced blameworthy innovations into Islam, to bring the faithful back to the purity of primitive faith and worship, and to restore the *Sunna* by the study and imitation of the Prophet's Tradition, these are the aspirations of many reformers who appear periodically in the religious history of Islam from the very beginnings of Sunnism. For Rashīd Riḍā, in each generation men emerge who are firmly committed to the defence of the *Sunna* and the struggle against *bid'at* (*Tafsir*, vii, 143); each century has produced a "regenerator" (*mudjaddid*) of the faith and the *Sunna*, men like "the *imām* Ibn Ḥazm [q.v.], the *mudjaddid* of the 5th century... the doctor of Islam, Aḥmad b. Taymiyya [q.v.], the *mudjaddid* of the 7th

century... the great traditionist (*hāfiẓ*) Ibn Ḥadjar al-ʿAskalānī [q.v.] in the 9th century... and the famous *imām* Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Šawkānī (1173/1760-1260/1834), the Yemeni *mudjaddid* in the 12th century." (*Tafsir*, vii, 144-5). All these men, and each in his own way, were indisputable architects of *iṣlāḥ*; among the many others who share this honour, al-Ḡhazālī springs to mind. Rashīd Riḍā notes with regret (*Tafsir*, vii, 143), however, that such exceptional men were generally alone (*ghurabā'*) in the world, like Islam itself. (Cf. the *ḥadīth*: "Islam was born alone, and will become alone again, as at its beginning. Happy the solitary men. Those are they who will come to reform that which will be debased after me" (cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 114 A: "Originated"). Although solitary, because of their opposition to the spirit of their times, and often the butt of authoritarian arrogance, worldly scepticism, and the hostility of conformists: '*ulamā'* and sycophants, the reformers nonetheless committed themselves to safeguarding the *Sunna* and, through it, the continuity of the original values of Islam. It is in this spirit, that of the reformers and renovators who animated the religious and cultural evolution of the *Umma*, and in tune with the defenders of the *Sunna* and the community's cohesion, that modern Muslim reformists are attempting to carry out their mission, over and above all ideologies, tendencies, and sectarianism. On the historical continuity of *iṣlāḥ* from the age of the Salaf to the dawn of the modern era, cf. 'Alī al-Ḥasanī al-Nadawī, *Riḍāl al-fikr wa 'l-da'wa fi 'l-iṣlām*, Damascus 1379/1960 (ends with *Djalāl al-Dīn Rūmī* 672/1273); 'Abd al-Muta'āl al-Ša'fī, *Al-Mudjaddidūn fi 'l-iṣlām...* (100-1370 H.), Cairo 1382/1962; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman...*, 29 ff.; H. Laoust, *Schismes*.

3.—*Iṣlāḥ* in modern Islam.—Viewed as part of the historico-cultural process outlined above, the modern reformism of the Salafiyya is an exceptionally fruitful period. In the breadth of its first manifestations, the diversity and stature of the talents it employed, the energy of its apostolate, and the relative speed of its diffusion in the Arab world and even far beyond, *iṣlāḥ* constitutes one of the most remarkable phenomena in the evolution of Islam since the end of the 19th century. It is a result of the cultural movement born of the renaissance (*nahḍa* [q.v.]) which marked the reawakening of the Arab East (along with that of the Muslim world in general) as a consequence of the influence of Western ideas and civilization. This awakening has been interpreted as a direct result of the actions of several forceful Muslim personalities living in the second half of the 19th century. Those most frequently mentioned are *Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī* (1839-97 [q.v.]), Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849-1905 [q.v.]) and Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibī (1854?-1902 [q.v.]). However, the awakening of Arabo-Muslim consciousness was preceded by a period of gestation which was encouraged by a combination of internal and external factors; most decisive of these were:

a) *The pressure of Wahhābism* [q.v.], which aimed (initially in Arabia) at restoring Islamic piety and ethics to their original purity and cultivated a sort of idealization of the primitive Islamic social organization, that of the "pious forefathers" *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* (hence the tendency called Salafiyya). Despite their zeal (which sometimes seemed excessive) in defence of their conception of the *Sunna*, their intransigence and their occasionally intolerant strictness, the Wahhābīs never lost sight of the need for a moral and political renewal of modern Islam. While

appealing to their co-religionists to recognize only the authority of the Qurʾān and the *Sunna* in matters of religion (*dīn*), they urged them to abandon superstitions inherited from the Middle Ages and countered the general tendency to fatalistic resignation, reacting against the spirit of *taḥlīd* [q.v.] which predominated at that time (end of the 18th-beginning of the 20th century). Through these efforts and their attempt to modernize the values of primitive Islam, *djihād* [q.v.], in particular, in the hope of rousing Muslims to a political dynamism equal to their past greatness, the Wahhābīs played an important role in the evolution of modern Islam, thus deserving a place among "the first of those who worked together towards the Arab renaissance" (L. Massignon, in *RMM*, xxxvi (1918-19), 325).

b) *The development of the printed word* through the press and publishing, principally in the Arabic language. In this respect the remarkable role played by the Egyptian printing house at Būlāḡ [see МАТБА'А] must be stressed. From 1822 onwards, this became one of the most important tools of the Arab intellectual renaissance. The Egyptians and Syro-Lebanese contributed to the growth of a serious and informative press which reflected the political and cultural aspirations of the nationalist and pro-reformist sectors of the population. (Cf. 'Abd al-Lāṭif al-Ṭibāwī, *American interests in Syria 1800-1901*, Oxford 1966, 247-53; Ph. K. Hitti, *Lebanon in History*, New York 1967, 452-64).

c) *The influence of Western culture*. European penetration of the Arab world in the first decades of the 19th century soon made itself felt, especially at an intellectual level. Cf. H. Pérès, *Les premières manifestations de la renaissance littéraire arabe en Orient au 19e siècle*, in *AIEO Algiers* (1934-5), 233-56; A. Hourani, *Arabic thought* (Bibl.); the succinct statement of the problem by Ḥusayn Mu'nis *La renaissance culturelle arabe*, in *Orient*, nos xli-xlii (1967), 16-27; J. Heyworth-Dunne, *An introd. to the hist. of education in modern Egypt*, London 1939, reprinted 1968, 96-287.

d) *The liberal evolution of the Ottoman regime*. This first occurred under the sultan 'Abd al-Maǧīd I [q.v.], who inaugurated a policy of reforms (*tanẓīmāt* [q.v.]) with the *Khaff-i sherif* of Nov. 3 1839 which granted his peoples the first imperial charter guaranteeing civil liberties. Despite the opposition of the traditionalists, these Western-inspired reforms were progressively put into effect, particularly after the *Khaff-i humāyūn* of Feb. 1 1856, which finally opened the Near East to the ideas and influences of the modern world. Cf. TANẪMĀT; F. M. Pareja, *Islamologie*, 339 ff., 583.

e) *The structural renovation of the Eastern churches* and their awakening to Western spirituality and ideas. Cf., e.g., on the exemplary case of the Uniate churches, the monograph by Joseph Hajjar, *Les Chrétiens uniates du Proche-Orient*, Paris 1962. As well as the renewal of local Christianity, thanks to a favourable concourse of religious and diplomatic events, the energy of Catholic and (above all) Protestant missions must be taken into account. On these missionary activities on Islamic soil, see the important material in *RMM*, xvi (1911), *A la conquête du monde musulman* (1 vol.); Kenneth Scott Latourette, *A hist. of the expansion of Christianity*, vi: *The great century (1800-1914)*, London 1944, chap. II (*Northern Africa and the Near East*), 6-64; A. al-Ṭibāwī, *American interests in Syria*, 316-24).

This missionary activity did not simply provoke a defensive reaction in the Muslim world. In the eyes

of many 'ulamā', it was exemplary from two points of view: it was a remarkable example of zeal in the service of a faith, and the actual content of its preaching was of value. Thus, in imitation of the Protestants, the reformists attached paramount importance to the Scriptures, though without ever losing sight of cultural needs and working towards an ethical and spiritual renewal of Islam. At the same time they aimed at the social and intellectual emancipation of the Muslim population by tirelessly advocating the popularization of modern knowledge.

These different factors (which must be placed in the general context of the Eastern question) gave rise to the intellectual ferment which led to the *nahḍa*. After centuries of cultural stagnation, the Arab renaissance provoked a lively intellectual curiosity in the East. From the beginning of the 19th century, the Arab élites began to acquire modern knowledge, some through translations, others by direct contact with European scientific culture and techniques. A decisive role was played by Arab student missions in Europe, by Western schools (religious and secular) in the Near East, and by national institutions organized on the European model. Cf. on this subject: C. Brockelmann, S II, 730 ff.; Djurdji Zaydān *Ta'rikh ādāb al-lughā al-'arabiyya*, Cairo 1914, iv 186-217; Jāk Tādjiir, *Harakat al-tarǧuma fī miṣr khilāl al-karn al-tāsi* 'aṣḥar, Cairo [1944]: the important study by J. Heyworth-Dunne, *An introd. to the hist. of education in modern Egypt*; Ph. K. Hitti, *Lebanon in History*, chap. xxxi.

For Arab writers this intellectual activity was accompanied by a historical and sociological enquiry in an attempt to analyse their social and cultural situation in order to determine the exact causes of their backwardness, naturally with a view to remedying it. This is the dominant theme of articles in *al-'Urwa al-wuthkā* (1884), then in *Manār* (from 1898 on), especially those by Raḥīd Riḍā and Muḥammad 'Abduh (cf. for instance, the series of articles in vol. v (1902), under the general title: *al-Islām wa 'l-Naṣrāniyya ma'a 'l-'ilm wa 'l-madaniyya* (136 p.). This is also the central topic of *Umm al-ḥurā*, in which al-Kawākibī attempts a precise diagnosis of the evils and that sort of general indolence (*futūr*) which characterized the Muslim community at the end of the 19th century (cf. the 7th session, 109 ff. *passim*); on the theme of the "backwardness" of the Muslim peoples, see also two accounts: Muḥammad 'Umar (d. 1337/1918), *Hādīr al-miṣriyyīn wa-sirr ta'akhhukhurim*, Cairo 1320/1902; Ṣakīb Arslān, *Limādhā ta'akhhkharā 'l-Muslimūn wa-limādhā taḥaddama ḡayruhum?* (Cairo ed. 1939).

The situation of Islam in the modern world thus became one of the most important themes in reformist writings. After Ernest Renan's famous lecture on *L'Islamisme et la Science* (Sorbonne, March 29 1883) and the subsequent controversy between Renan and Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afḡhānī (cf. on this subject Homa Pakdaman, *Djamāl-Ed-Din*, 81 ff.), one of the major preoccupations of reformist authors was to refute the thesis that Islam is contrary to the scientific spirit and can thus be held responsible for the cultural backwardness of the Muslim peoples. "We wore out our pens and our voices", cries Raḥīd Riḍā "through writing and repeating that the misfortunes of Muslims cannot be blamed on their religion, but rather on the innovations that they have introduced into it, and on the fact that they 'wear' Islam like a fur coat turned inside out" (*Manār*, iii (1900), 244). Cf. also the pleas of Muḥammad 'Abduh, *al-Islām wa 'l-Naṣrāniyya*, and Muḥammad

Farid Wajidi, *Taḥbiḥ al-dīyāna al-islāmīyya 'ala 'l-nawāmis al-madaniyya*, Cairo 1316/1898.

Having established their view of the situation, the reformists planned ways to stir up a new spirit in their co-religionists and to arouse in the Community the will to break out of its cultural and social stagnation. For this purpose, they continually referred to the kur'ānic verse: "Allāh altereth not what is in a people until they alter what is in themselves" (cf. *al-'Urwa al-wuthqā*, no. xvii (Sept. 1884), editorial reproduced by Rashīd Riḍā in his *Tafsīr*, x, 46-52; Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawhīd*, 178 (Fr. trans., 121); Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr* x, 41-5, on *sūra* VIII, 54). From this point of view, reformist thought seems to have crystallized around the idea of improvement (*islāh*) of the existing situation. To achieve this goal, the adherents of *islāh* advocated a struggle against those religious forces (in particular the brotherhoods) and social groups (conservative and traditionalist forces) which they saw as the incarnation of obscurantism. They also supported the reform of archaic teaching methods and courses and the popularization of scientific disciplines and modern techniques. Since they had no training in these last two fields, the reformists could do no more than stress the usefulness of Western sciences and techniques as essential instruments for the material and intellectual progress of the Muslim peoples. However, they devoted the greater and most effective part of their efforts to action in the moral and social fields, where they had more ready access to an adequate vocabulary.

Reformist appeals for social and intellectual evolution (*taḥaddum, tarakkūf*) concentrated on the need to improve, correct, reorganize, renovate and restore: all these infinitives corresponding, *grosso modo*, to the different meanings of the *maṣḍar, islāh* (cf. Lane, i/4, 1714: *ṢLḤ*). From then on *islāh* became a sort of leitmotiv in reformist literature. In the texts of Muḥammad 'Abduh, for example, we frequently find this term used as the mark of an impelling idea even in his earliest writings; cf. his first articles in the paper *al-Ahrām* (1st year, 1876) reproduced by Rashīd Riḍā in *Ta'rīkh al-ustādh al-imām*, ii, 20, 22, 34; his articles in the official paper *al-Waḥdā' al-miṣriyya*, 1880-1 (*ibid.*, 175-81). *Islāh* also appears at every opportunity and in its different meanings in the review *al-Manār* (whose first no. dates from 22 Shawwāl 1315/16 March 1898). We find, for example, the following usages: *al-islāh al-dīnī wa 'l-idjtimā'ī* ("religious and social reform", i (1898), 2); *islāh kutub al-'ilm wa-tarīkat al-ta'lim* ("improvement of textbooks and reform of teaching methods", *ibid.*, 11); *islāh dākhiliyyāt al-mamlaka* ("reform (or reorganization) of the internal affairs of the Empire", *ibid.*, 736); *islāh al-nufūs* ("regeneration of souls", *ibid.*, 737); *islāh al-ḥaqāq asās al-islāh* ("law reform, as a basis for general reform", *ibid.*); in the editorial of the 40th no. (1898), Rashīd Riḍā calls for a "renovation from the pulpit eloquence" (*islāh al-khiṭāba*); in no. 42, p. 822, he proposes: *muḥāwara fī islāh al-Azhar* ("exchange of views on the reform of al-Azhar").

These few references show the variety of uses to which the concept *islāh* was put. However, the following areas seem particularly to have attracted the attention of reformist authors: a) *Teaching*. The question of the reorganization of Muslim teaching, especially in institutes of higher education like al-Azhar, occupied an important place in the work of Muḥammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā (cf. the account of the action carried out in this sphere by *shaykh*

'Abduh in *Ta'rīkh al-ustādh al-imām*, i, 425-567). This problem can be linked to that of the reorganization of the mosques and *wakf* possessions. Better management of these would supply the educational system with increased means and new buildings. (Cf. Rashīd Riḍā, *op. cit.*, i, 630-45; *al-Manār wa 'l-Azhar, passim*). b) *Law*. The reform of the Muslim legal system was also one of the constant preoccupations of the reformists (see the numerous articles in *Manār* on this subject and the *Report* made by Muḥammad 'Abduh, Mufti of Egypt, *Tahrir mufti al-diyār al-miṣriyya fī islāh al-mahākīm al-shar'iyya*, Cairo 1318/1900; cf. on this subject *Ta'rīkh al-ustādh al-imām*, i, 605-29). c) *The Religious Brotherhoods*. The reformists never ceased to press for the reform (if not for abolition pure and simple) of the brotherhoods, which they accused of maintaining blameworthy innovations in religious life, of encouraging the people in superstitious beliefs and practices, and of continuing to use a reactionary system of teaching in their educational establishments (cf. the articles in *Manār*, under the heading: *al-Bida' wa'l-khurāfāt*; Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār wa 'l-Azhar, passim*). In their attempt to reform Muslim educational and legal systems and religious practice, the supporters of *islāh* were aware that they were attacking the traditional structures of Muslim society, yet they felt it was essentially to renovate these structures so that a new much-needed social and cultural dynamism should be given to the Community. But their task did not stop there. For the *islāh* advocated by Muḥammad 'Abduh and his close supporters necessitated a vast movement of renovation which would embrace all sectors of Muslim life. Thus we see them advocating *islāh* in purely secular domains (for example, language and literature, the organization of schools, the administration, the military regime, etc.). They believed that the 'ulamā' worthy of the name should devote themselves to an overall reform of Muslim social organization, and not just to a limited religious reformism.

These calls for a general *islāh* were fairly well received in Arab and Muslim intellectual circles at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. From the period of *al-'Urwa al-wuthqā* (1884) on, the combined efforts of al-Afghānī and 'Abduh, and other propagandists of the quality of al-Kawākibī, succeeded in definitively integrating the idea of *islāh* into modern Muslim thinking. From then on, no intellectual in the Arab world could remain indifferent to the reformist phenomenon (cf. *al-Manār*, i, (1899), 949: *al-islāh al-islāmī wa 'l-sihāfa: islāh* had become one of the principal and most topical subjects in the Arab and Turkish press; *Umm al-kurā*, 3). In literary circles, many profoundly secular writers and poets joined forces with the advocates of *islāh*. Their sympathies did not lie with the religious movement, but with the powerful ferment that it then represented for Muslim society and for Arabs in general. For them, *islāh* signified an appeal for progress, a breath of renewal and the promise of a better future for the Arab nation. Its fundamental call for religious renovation and moral regeneration was blurred in the eyes of many intellectuals by its social and cultural implications. Gradually *islāh* acquired the shape of a sort of myth which attracted all, believers and unbelievers, Muslims or not, who were struggling for the social and cultural emancipation of their people. (The impact of *islāh* in non-Muslim circles is apparent in writers like Salāma Mūsā; cf. *Tarbiyat Salāma Mūsā*,

Cairo 1944, 52 [Eng. trans. Schuman, *The education of Salāma Mūsā*, Leiden 1961, 35]). This is why, concurrently with the religious reformists (the Salafiyya), some concerned secular intellectuals took up the cry for *islāh*, though with a purely social and cultural connotation. The most typical figure of this secular reformist current is the 'Irāqī poet Djamīl Şidkī al-Zahāwī (1863-1936 [q.v.]), who advocated a form of *islāh* devoid of any religious content (his beliefs are expressed in: *nashariu fi 'l-nāsi arā'au uridu bi-hā'islāha dunyā-humū lā 'l-fa'na fi 'l-dīni*).

The relative receptivity of Arab intellectual circles (more or less influenced by Western culture) was a determining factor in the diffusion of *islāh*. The reformists found allies, if not true sympathizers, among publicists and men of letters who were exasperated by the conservatism of the "old turbans", the defenders of clerical and university tradition (of al-Azhar, al-Zaytūna, etc.), by the apathy of the masses, and by the sluggishness of the political and administrative machine. Thus in the East as in the Maghrib, the younger progressive intellectuals drew close to the reformists, who in their eyes represented a dynamic party which, in the face of different forms of foreign domination, proclaimed the right of their peoples to education, progress and national dignity.

But *islāh* also benefited from a measure of support in liberal Sunni circles. Frightened by the prospect of society drifting away from Islam in the more or less distant future, and by the dynamism of Christian missionary work in Muslim lands, they were happy to witness the birth of a movement which was profoundly attached to the *Sunna*, and firmly committed to the defence of the faith, while at the same time recognizing the need for social evolution and modern scientific and technical development in the Arab world.

Yet, despite the interest that it aroused in the young progressive generation and enlightened Sunnis, *islāh* encountered some difficulties at the outset. From its inception, the movement was suspect to the powers then ruling the major part of the Arab world (Turkey, England, France), because of its cultural and political orientation (exaltation of Arabism, Panislamism). Its social and political stand brought down on it the hostility of the ruling classes and the administrative authorities of the *status quo* (university, magistrates, religious hierarchy, brotherhoods). By its declarations of war on every sort of *bid'ā*, on magical and religious superstitions, on customs "worthy of paganism" (*djāhiliyya*), and by the rigorously monotheist theology (*lawḥid*), which led it to see manifestations of *shirk* in many naive forms of popular piety, *islāh* distressed conformist circles. For the same reasons it was mistrusted by ordinary people, who were attached to traditions and rites that they regarded as an integral part of religion.

Inevitably, *islāh* was strongly attacked on several fronts (cf. for example, the long quarrel between supporters of *islāh* against the defenders of the educational and doctrinal traditions of al-Azhar, in Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār wa 'l-Azhar*). After all, it was a movement vowed to political resistance (anti-imperialist, if not anti-Ottoman) and social change (aimed at the traditional framework of Muslim society), and geared to moral and spiritual reform, attacking in particular certain ecclesiastical structures which were held as sacred (notably the brotherhoods and religious orders) and certain aspects of popular

religiosity. Lacking a single magistrature amongst the *umma* and unable to invoke the moral authority of a reforming Church, the Salafiyya were open to the charge that they were changing and destroying the holy Sunni tradition. They had to wage an unceasing struggle for acceptance of the sincerity of their intentions and what they saw as the eminently Islamic character of their attempts at reform. Nevertheless, neither the traditionalist Sunnis nor the members of the brotherhoods were disposed to recognize the legitimacy of their efforts (cf. *Manār*, I, 807, 822; Rashīd Riḍā attacked by his adversaries; Rashīd Riḍā, *Ta'rikh al-ustādḥ al-imām, passim*: the difficulties Muḥammad 'Abduḥ met with when he was Mufti of Egypt; Zāfir al-Kāsimī, *Djamāl al-Dīn al-Kāsimī*, 594; the bad reception given to Rashīd Riḍā by the 'ulama' of Damascus, 603-4; the lack of success of the Salafiyya in Syria; A. Merad *Le Réformisme musulman*... Book I: *the resistance of Algerian Sunnism and brotherhoods to reformist propaganda*). Whether presented as a "road to damnation" (*ḍalāla*) in the wake of the Wahhābī "heresy", or hastily assimilated to the progressive trends that were more or less favourable to the secularization of Muslim society, the Salafiyya movement met with strong opposition in Egypt and Syria, as in Algeria and Tunisia. Its adversaries rejected it in the name of the *Sunna*, which, in their eyes, could have no other form than that of classical Sunnism. The real meaning of *islāh* appears when we examine its fundamental principles and its main doctrinal lines.

B.—FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.—In origin, *islāh* is a religiously inspired movement. Yet an examination of the roots of the movement reveals that the arguments put forward by its proponents sounded a less profoundly moral and spiritual note than a social and cultural one. In the first reformist manifestos—the articles of Muḥammad 'Abduḥ (and al-Afghānī) in the paper *al-'Urwa al-wuthqā* (1884)—social, cultural and even political considerations are more important than religious ones. In his *Umm al-ḥurā* and in his *Tabā'i' al-istibdād*, al-Kawākibī made similar efforts. In the early stages of his review *al-Manār* (1898), Rashīd Riḍā also paid a great deal of attention to social and cultural questions. Like his masters, he wished to persuade Muslims that the improvement of their moral and material condition depended upon a regeneration of Islam; this was to be accomplished by a "return to first principles", in order to rediscover Islamic teachings and values in all their authenticity and richness. The whole of the later reformist debate hinges on this essential theme.

The Return to First Principles.—The theme of the return (*ruḍū'*) to first principles is omnipresent in reformist literature. This constant reference to the beginnings of Islam is one of the most striking characteristics of *islāh*, and the reason why the reformists of the Salafiyya have sometimes been accused of "addiction to the past". The need for a return to first principles is justified, in the doctrine of *islāh*, by arguments of a canonical and historical nature. The former, drawn from the *Qur'ān*, can be resumed as follows: Islam in its entirety is contained in the Scriptures (*Qur'ān*, V, 3, VI, 38); the teaching of the Prophet—inspired by God (LIII, 3-4)—is the natural complement of revelation. The Religion can be received only from the hands of God and his Messenger (IV, 59), and Muslims must abide by what the Messenger of God has transmitted, in all matters of command and interdiction (LIX, 7). For the reformists, consequently, fidelity to Islam

is essentially defined by faithfulness to the two Sources, Revelation and the Prophet's *Sunna*.

The canonical argument, supported by an argument borrowed from historical tradition, is in fact a maxim attributed to Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/795 [q.v.]): "The later success of this Community will only ensue through those elements which made for its initial success" (*lā yaṣluḥu ākhīru ḥādhīhi 'l-umma illā bi-mā ṣaluḥa bihi awwaluhā*). Now, we are told, the objective basis of the historical success of the Arabs was Islam (that is the *Ḳur'ān* and the *Sunna*) authentically received and fully accepted (cf. Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, x, 437, xi, 210 (important) ix, 293; *Shihāb*, March 1939, 58). Like their far-distant predecessors (*Salaf*), Muslims of today could achieve temporal power (*siyāda*) and know the happiness of moral well-being (*sa'āda*), provided that they armed themselves with those moral convictions that constituted the strength and grandeur of the *Salaf*, and that they strove to demonstrate to contemporary Muslim society the values of faith and the general teachings of Islam, in their authentic purity (cf. Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, ii, 339-41, x, 210; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman*, 287 ff.). What exactly is this authenticity? The reformist reply is clear and simple: the whole of Islam is contained in the Scriptures and the *Sunna*, with the addition, solely as a guide and not as a canonical source, of the tradition of the *Salaf*. This position is not fundamentally different from that of traditional Sunnism. What distinguishes *islāh* from the classical doctrine in this respect is the meaning given by the reformists to each of these three basic references.

1.—The reference to the *Ḳur'ān*.—On this point, *islāh* has, in principle, the same position as the *Salaf*. This is true of the nature of the *Ḳur'ān*, its status as a canonical source, and the way of approaching its exegesis.

a) *Islāh* identifies the *Ḳur'ān* with the Word of God, uncreated, intangible, unalterable (*Ḳur'ān*, XLI, 42, XV, 9), and affirms the eternity and universality of its message (XXXIV, 28, VI, 90; *Manār*, i, 1; Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, ii, 163, iii, 289). Holding stringently to the dogma of the "uncreated *Ḳur'ān*" it rejects the harmonizing synthesis of Ash'arism, since this does not simply reaffirm the stance of the *Salaf* (cf. Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, ix, 178). This explains why the *Salafiyya* have never been able to supply the Muslims of their time with an original interpretation of the *Ḳur'ān*, despite the return to favour of reason in modern Islam (cf. R. Caspar, *Le renouveau du Moufazzilisme*, in MIDEO, iv (1957), 141 ff.), and despite the historical investigations and psychological analyses made in the light of the *Sīra* by European orientalisks and a few contemporary Muslim authors which have given us a better knowledge of the Prophet's personality. Their doctrine, immobilized by a desire to remain faithful to the past and to the positions—sometimes negative—of the *Salaf*, has prevented them from acquiring a deeper knowledge of the historical, sociological and psychological discoveries which would have given them a truer understanding of the problems of revelation and inspiration. (On the subject of the *waḥy* [q.v.], cf. the decisive statement by Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, xi, 146-94, in which he reaffirms the thesis of the revelation "that came down from God", without attempting to introduce any nuances into the traditional explanation; hence his long rebuttal (*ibid.*, 169-78) of the ideas expressed on this subject by certain authors, notably by E. Dermenghem (in *La Vie de Mahomet*, Paris 1929, chap. xviii)).

When discussing the nature of the *Ḳur'ān*, Muḥammad 'Abduh attempted to go further than traditional dogma in the original edition of his *Risālat al-tawḥīd* (Bulāḡ 1315/1898). The original text (28, l'r. trans., 33, 1.2, to 34, 1.4), expurgated at this point by Rashīd Riḍā (2nd ed., Cairo 1316/1908), is once more available in the ed. of the *Risālat al-tawḥīd* prepared by Maḥmūd Abū Rayya (Cairo 1966, 52-2). Rashīd Riḍā himself vigorously affirmed the divine character of the Book (*Tafsīr*, i, 132-3, 220, vi, 71, viii, 10, 280, 303, ix, 178, xii, 499), wholly discounting any rationalist interpretation. The same stance is clear in the works of Ibn Bādīs, in his *Ḳur'ānic* commentary on the *Shihāb*: "The *Ḳur'ān* is the Word of God and His Revelation" (Jan. 1934, 55).

b) *The Ḳur'ān, primary canonical source*. The *Ḳur'ān* is "the foundation of the religion" (*asās al-dīn*, *Tafsīr*, i, 369, vii, 139, 198, ix, 326; Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Feb. 1936, 95); more than that, it really constitutes religion in all its richness, *bal huwa 'l-dīn kulluhu* (*Tafsīr* vi, 154-67, vii, 139, 198, ix, 326). With the *Ḳur'ānic* revelation, religion was accomplished, according to the divine proclamation: "Today I have perfected your religion..." (V, 4). By "religion", explains Rashīd Riḍā (taking up "the opinion of Ibn 'Abbās and the majority of the *Salaf*"), is meant the following: "matters of faith (*ʿaḳā'id*), legal injunctions (*ahkām*) and ethical ones (*ādāb*)" (*Tafsīr*, vi, 166, at the foot of the page).

The *Ḳur'ān* is thus the supreme source of the religion. Moreover, it contains, in prototypal form, everything needed for the historical life of the Community. Paraphrasing XVII, 13, Ibn Bādīs concludes: "All that the servants of God have need of to acquire happiness in the two worlds, that is true beliefs, solid moral virtues, just laws, generous sentiments, all this has been clearly expressed in the *Ḳur'ān*" (*Shihāb*, Dec. 1929-Jan. 1930, 7). As far as the political organization of Muslim society and the running of its affairs are concerned, the *Ḳur'ān* only gives general indications, leaving to the lawful rulers of the Community, the *ulū 'l-amr*, the task of making decisions according to circumstances and in the best interest (*maṣlaḥa*) of Muslims (cf. *Manār*, iv (1901), 210; *Tafsīr*, iii, 10-1, 12 (important), iv, 199-205 (important), vi, 123, vii, 140-1, 191, xi, 264). The *Ḳur'ān* is the supreme authority of Islam, and, as such, the problem of its understanding (and consequently of its exegesis) is of capital importance, for the way in which the Revelation is understood governs the manner in which the message is translated into action.

c) *The exegesis of the Ḳur'ān*. Linguistically, the content of the *Ḳur'ān* is presented in two categories (cf. III, 7). Most of the verses have a self-evident meaning (*muḥkam*) and pose no problems of interpretation. Certain other verses can be the cause of some uncertainty (*mutashābih*) if their apparent sense is adhered to. In this case, the Believer must accept the revealed fact as it is presented (*imrār*) in its most literal sense, showing a confident belief in the truth it contains, a truth which transcends the immediately perceptible linguistic message (cf. *Tafsīr* viii, 453, x, 141). God being the only one to know the reality of the *mutashābih*, the Believer must have the wisdom and humility to commend himself to Him (*tafwīḍ, taslīm*). In the eyes of Muḥammad 'Abduh this act of faith acquires the value of a canonical obligation (*Tafsīr*, i, 252). This is also the position of Rashīd Riḍā and Ibn Bādīs (cf. *Tafsīr*, iii, 167, iv, 256, vii, 472, viii, 453, ix, 513, x, 141, xii, 378; *Shihāb*, Jan. 1934, 6 June 1939, 206).

The reformist doctrine on the subject of *ḥur'ānic* exegesis can be defined in relation to the problems of interpretation, *ta'wīl* [q.v.], and commentary, *tafsīr* [q.v.].

Iṣlāh severely condemns subjective interpretation (*ta'wīl*), which claims to analyse a "hidden" sense beyond the literal sense, and a more or less gratuitous symbolism beyond the apparent images. On the subject of III, 7, Rashīd Riḍā clearly defines the reformist position (*Tafsīr*, iii, 166 ff.). *Ta'wīl* is a typical example of *bid'a* (*ibid.*, x, 141), since it cannot be justified either by the *Sunna* or by the tradition of the Salaf, who avoided interpreting uncertain passages (*mulashābiḥ*) of the Scripture by relying on their own understanding (see also Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 7 [Fr. trans., 8]). The Salafiyya's distrust of *ta'wīl* includes all esoteric and mystical interpretations and those of the supporters of a rational explanation at any cost. Cf. *Tafsīr*, i, 252-3, iii, 172-96: an explanation of the reformist doctrine of the subject of the *ta'wīl*, with lengthy quotations from Ibn Taymiyya; criticism of the tendentious exegesis of the "men of *bid'a*" (Djāmiyya, Qadariyya, Khawāridj, Bāṭiniyya, Bābiyya, Bahā'iyya, etc.), ix, 131-2; the "heretical" exegesis of the Bāṭiniyya and of excessive Sūfism; iv, 191; exegesis which is "orientated" in favour of one sect or another, and which in fact results in giving a purely arbitrary sense to the revealed statement. This is *taḥrīf* itself [q.v.], a concept applied in the *Qur'ān* to the "Possessors of the Scriptures" (*ahl al-kitāb*) and applied by the modern reformists to stigmatize the use of the *ḥur'ānic* exegesis for partisan ends (cf. *Tafsīr*, i, 430, iv, 97, 282, vii, 506; *Shihāb*, Sept. 1935, 344-5). Included in the term *taḥrīf* are pseudo-erudite commentaries which embroider the text with "false legends" (*abāṭil wa-ḥurāfāt*), in the style of the *isrā'īliyyāt* [q.v.] so frequently denounced by the reformist authors (*Tafsīr*, i, 8, 18, 347, ii, 455, 471, iv, 466, vi, 332, 355-6, 449, ix, 190, 414, x, 384, xi, 474; *Shihāb*, July 1939, 254). The same warnings were issued against interpretation of the *ḥur'ānic* passages dealing with the unknowable, *ghayb* [q.v.] (cf. *Tafsīr*, i, 252, iii, 166 ff., iv, 254 ff. on III, 173, IX, 513; *Shihāb*, Oct. 1930, 534; Jan. 1934, 1-9).

Reformist exegesis tends to banish *ta'wīl* in favour of simple commentary, *tafsīr*, and lays down the principle that, apart from a few verses containing a certain mystery (particularly on the subject of divine attributes, *ṣifāt*, and the states of future life, *aḥwāl al-ākhirā*), *ḥur'ānic* revelation can be made just as comprehensible to contemporary Muslims as it was to the Salaf. Thus, the function of *tafsīr* is revitalized. Freed from its historico-legendary husk and from commentaries of a largely grammatical and rhetorical nature, *tafsīr* becomes a preparation for reading and meditating upon the *Qur'ān*. Those commentators whose primary interest was in the didactic aspect of *tafsīr* have woven a veritable screen (*hidāb*) between Muslims and their sacred book (*Tafsīr*, iii, 302). According to the reformists, the essential aim of *tafsīr* is to elucidate the moral values and spiritual "direction" (*ḥady*) which nourish religious feeling and guide the piety of the faithful (*ibid.*, i, 25); it must not be seen as a demonstrative discipline capable of establishing scientific and verifiable truths and satisfying the modern mind which is avid for rationality. The reformist commentators (and above all Rashīd Riḍā and Ibn Bādīs) were in no way tempted by scientific exegesis, and, with the odd exception, did not give in to the fashion for

compromise which was widespread in their day (cf. the typical case of a Ṭantāwī Dījawharī (1862-1940), in *MIDEO*, v (1958), 115-74). Consequently Rashīd Riḍā criticizes the lack of discernment with which Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī [q.v.] appeals to the scientific culture of his time to pad out his important commentary. He deplores an identical tendency amongst "contemporary commentators [...] who display so much seemingly scientific erudition in their *tafsīrs* that they succeed in diverting the reader from the object of the Revelation" (*Tafsīr*, i, 75). Moreover, when speaking of the biblically inspired stories recounted in the *Qur'ān*, Rashīd Riḍā, quoting Muḥammad 'Abduh, criticizes those who would like to base the truth of the Book on the veracity of the facts it offers to the meditation of the Believers. "The *Qur'ān* is no more a historical work (*ta'rikḥ*) than a narrative work (*ḥaṣaṣ*): it is only a moral guide and a source of edification" (*Tafsīr*, ii, 471). The historicity of the *ḥur'ānic* story is less important than its moral content and its virtue as a source of inspiration. The role of the reformist commentator is above all to bring the *ḥur'ānic* message as close as possible to the minds and hearts of Muslims. In his task, his goal will of course be to establish the meaning of the verses as exactly as human understanding permits. This implies a profound knowledge of all the resources of Arab lexicography and philology. There are some verses whose message is readily apparent; in some cases, what is revealed can be made more explicit with the help of references and parallels found in the *Qur'ān* itself (*tafsīr al-Qur'ān bi 'l-Qur'ān*); in other cases it is necessary to employ early exegesis by returning to the versions given by the Great Companions and their principal disciples amongst the *tābi'ūn*, following the explanations supplied by the Prophet in person as part of the revelation. Any exegesis not based on proofs (*dalā'il*) taken from the *Sunna* (in the absence of explicit scriptural reference) is suspect and thus unacceptable (Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 129 [Fr. trans., 137]; *Tafsīr*, i, 8, 174-5, iii, 327). Hence the idea of the fundamentally complementary nature of the Scripture and the *Sunna*.

2.—The *Sunna*.—From the standpoint of *iṣlāh* the *Sunna* must be placed next to Revelation as second canonical source. However, reformist teaching is not in complete agreement on whether it is a constitutive source, like Revelation, or simply an explanation of the latter. The following are the main doctrinal positions:

The Sunna is of the same essence as the Qur'ān.—This is the point of view of Ibn Bādīs, who affirms the profound unity that links the *Sunna* and the Scriptures. "The expression: 'Revelation of the Lord compassionate', [*Qur'ān*, XXXVI, 58] means that the religion is, in its entirety, a revelation from God... for the source of Islam... is the *Qur'ān*, which is a divine revelation, and the *Sunna*, which is also a revelation, as these words of the Almighty prove [quotation of LIII, 4]" (*Shihāb*, Feb. 1936, 95). This radical position is similar to that of the Zāhirite Ibn Ḥazm, who also held the *Sunna* to be on a par with Revelation (cf. his *Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām*, Cairo 1345/1927, i, 121-2. *Ḥadīth* provides an argument in favour of this thesis (cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 223 A: "—revealed to Muḥammad by Dījibrīl just as the *Qur'ān* was revealed"). It was only partially shared by Rashīd Riḍā, but he admits that "revelation is not limited to the *Qur'ān*" (*Tafsīr*... ii, 139, v, 279, 470). Some of the Prophet's teachings, on the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ḥudus*)

have the same importance as the Kurʾān, but their level of expression does not assume the inimitable nature of the latter (*ibid.*, v, 279, § 3).

The Sunna makes Revelation explicit.—All the reformist authors agree on this point. The Kurʾān clearly says that the Prophet's mission is to make manifest to men (*li-tubayyina li 'l-nās*) the true meaning of the Scriptures (*Tafsīr* . . . , ii, 30, vi, 159, 472, vii, 139, viii, 255, 309; *Shihāb*, Oct. 1930, 532; Feb. 1932, 73). The *Sunna* is second in importance to the Book, since it is an explanatory instrument (*Tafsīr* . . . , iv, 18, on III, 101); the Kurʾān constitutes the totality of the religion, and the *Sunna* is an integral part of the latter only in the sense that it explains what was revealed (*ibid.*, ix, 326). Herein lies the status of the *Sunna* as the second canonical source.

By *Sunna* is meant only the texts of *Hadīth* the authenticity of which has been duly established (cf. Muḥammad ʿAbduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 129 [Fr. transl., 132]), a very limited number of traditions which refer above all to the dogmas of faith and the forms of worship (e.g. prayer, pilgrimage). Beyond these descriptive traditions of holy acts, the remaining traditions about which there is no doubt (e.g. those with a moral content) "do not number more than a dozen" (*Risālat al-tawḥīd*, ed. Rashīd Riḍā 202 note 2; *Tafsīr* . . . , v, 365). A tradition is not necessarily to be believed just because it is attributed to the Prophet, even if it carries the authority of an eminent traditionist or famous teacher. Rashīd Riḍā cites the example of Ghazālī, who gave as authentic traditions which were "insignificant or simply invented" (*Tafsīr*, vii, 31). He was also severely critical of the apocryphal traditions (*mawḍūʿ*), attributing their origin to various factors: *ẓandāqa* [q.v.], sectarianism, flattery towards rulers, human error, and senile forgetfulness. Moreover, rigorism and puritanism encouraged the traditionists to incorporate into *Hadīth* moral maxims which they considered just as edifying as certain traditions called "weak".

The problem of the authenticity of *Hadīth* is extremely important from the reformist point of view, for the authenticity of a *sunna* is the basis of its authority as a canonical source. All that is transmitted by the Prophet originates from God and must therefore be an article of faith for Believers (Kurʾān, IV, 80: "Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allāh"). Thus Muslims have every right to reject any normative tradition the authenticity of which is not absolutely beyond doubt, as is the Kurʾān. Hence the necessity of great care in distinguishing between the *Sunna*, which carries the same authority as Scripture, and the traditions whose authenticity has not been completely established, even if they are in harmony with the "spirit" of the Salaf. In fact, the Salafiyya only recognize the normative value of a very small number of *ḥadīths* which are held to be rigorously authentic: *aḥādīth mutawāṭīra*, *wa-ḥalīl*^m *mā hī* (*Manār*, iii, 572). By stating that Muslims are obliged to follow "the Kurʾān and the *Sunna*, and them alone" (al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḥurā*, 73; Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr* . . . , *passim*; Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Feb. 1936, 95), the reformists based their doctrine on the teachings of the Prophet (cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 130 A: "Clinging to Kurʾān and *Sunna* alone"; 223 A: "Confining oneself to Kurʾān and *Sunna*"). But, bearing in mind their very limitative conception of the *Sunna*, they maintain in fact that Islam as a religion (*dīn*) can essentially be reduced to the Kurʾān.

The doctrine of *ishlāḥ* tends to attach a greater importance to the Kurʾān as a source than to *Hadīth* as it has generally been accepted in classical dogmas. This trend is taken to its logical conclusion in the works of recent authors, who reduce the authority of *Hadīth* almost out of existence in favour of the Kurʾān and *iditihād* [q.v.] (cf. Maḥmūd Abū Rayya, a former disciple of Rashīd Riḍā: *Aḍwā ʿala 'l-sunna al-muḥammadiyya*, Cairo 1958; and on present positions on the subject of *Hadīth*: *REI*, 1954, *Abstracta*, 117-23; G. H. A. Juynboll, *The authenticity of the tradition literature*, Leiden 1969).

Logically, Islam could no doubt be defined exclusively in relation to the Kurʾān, a thesis upheld by another disciple of Rashīd Riḍā, Muḥammad Tawfīq Ṣidqī, in his work *al-Islām huwa 'l-Kurʾān waḥdah* which is a programme in its own right (*Manār* ix (1906), 515-25, 906-25). For this author, the foundations of Islam are the Book of God and Reason. Any doctrinal element imputed to Islam which satisfies neither the criterion of the given facts of the Kurʾān nor the fundamental demands of reason must be declared unacceptable. Elsewhere, M. T. Ṣidqī demands complete freedom in evaluating the *Sunna*. It must be limited in so far as it is in disagreement with the objective facts of the Book, but where it puts forward principles of wisdom (*ḥikma*) there is nothing to prevent the Believer from referring to it, as he might to any (profane) source. The Salafiyya certainly do not go to quite these lengths. The thesis of Muḥammad Tawfīq Ṣidqī (presented with some reservations by Rashīd Riḍā) was immediately refuted by a defender of the classical doctrine (cf. Ṭahā al-Bishrī, *Uṣūl al-Islām: al-Kurʾān, al-Sunna, al-ijmāʿ, al-ḥiyās*, in *Manār*, ix, 699-711). In the eyes of the Salafiyya Islam cannot be reduced to matters of faith and canonical obligation (*ibādāt*) which can only be held to be true in so far as they originate from Revelation and the very small number of *ḥadīths* shown to be authentic (*mutawāṭīr*). Islam is also a political and social system, a complex of ethical values, a culture. In matters of usage (*ʿādāt*) and human relations (*muʿāmalāt*) determined by a socio-cultural framework which is not ruled by scriptural dispositions (*naṣṣ*), the *Sunna* and the traditions of the Salaf are helpful and instructive; they are indeed exemplary and worthy of the attention of Muslims as an excellent reference for both action and moral life. Beside these two sources, *ishlāḥ* attaches great value to the tradition of the Salaf, which it holds to be eminently representative of the Prophet's tradition and thus indispensable for anybody who wishes to grasp the authentic message of Islam at its source.

3.—The tradition of the Salaf.—To a large extent, *ishlāḥ* appeals to the tradition of the Salaf as an explanatory source for the *Sunna* and an important reference point for understanding the general meaning of Islam. The term *salaf* designates a fact that is both historical and cultural. It implies firstly the idea of anteriority (cf. Kurʾān XLIII, 57), which in classical usage is naturally linked with the idea of authority and exemplariness. The Salaf are precisely the "virtuous forefathers" (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*), the predecessors whose perfect orthodoxy, piety, holiness, and religious knowledge make them men worthy of being taken as models and guides. But, in the absence of sure and sufficient biographical references, these are difficult to ascertain. It is not so much their personal qualities, however striking, that make for the authority of the Salaf, but rather their historical experience, their contact with the


Prophet in some cases and with his Companions and Successors in others. Among the innumerable witnesses of primitive Islam, the Salaf are exemplary. They represent a certain form of Islamic orthodoxy at a given period of history. Hence the need to sketch the historical context of the Salaf. The chronological points of reference are inexact and often contradictory. By *salaf* was meant, for example:—a. the "Mother of the Believers", 'Ā'isha, and the Patriarchal Caliphs, as well as Ṭalḥa and Zubayr (Lane, Book iv, 1408 C);—b. the principle *tābi'ūn* (*ibid.*);—c. the Prophet's Companions (al-Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, ed. Ma'ārif, i, 93);—d. The Companions and their successors (*tābi'ūn*, on the one hand in relation to the founders of the four *madhabs* (cf. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal who talks of "our pious forefathers", *salafūna al-sāliḥ*, Wensinck, *Concordances* . . . , i, 505 B); and on the other the latter and their immediate disciples in relation to succeeding generations (al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf ishtihāt al-funūn*, ed. Khayyāt, iii, 676-7). In the works of modern reformist authors the definition of the Salaf is just as vague. For Rashīd Riḍā they are the most eminent representatives of the primitive Islamic community, *al-sadr al-awwal* (*Tafsīr*, ii, 81, vii, 143, 198), those of the "first epoch", *al-aṣr al-awwal* (*ibid.*, vi, 196, iii, 572), which covers the first three generations, *ḥarn* (this term is not to be taken in the modern sense of "century" but in that of a "generation of men" (*djil*) who lived during the same period of seventy to eighty years [*ibid.*, xi, 314, xii, 190]). In the works of Rashīd Riḍā and Ibn Bādīs we find the same traditional definition of the three first generations; i.e., that of the Prophet and his Companions (*ṣaḥāba*), that of their Followers (*tābi'ūn*) and that of the Successors of the latter, *al-bā' al-tābi'īn* (*Tafsīr*, viii, 50; *Shihāb*, April 1937, 434), generations "which surpass in excellence (*khayriyya*) all others, as is witnessed by the Impeccable [i.e., Muḥammad]" (*Shihāb*, Feb. 1932, 66, allusion to the *ḥadiṭh*: "the best of generations is mine, then the following, then that which comes after", cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 48A, lg. 40: "the best. . ."). This is worth comparing with the other *ḥadiṭh*, quoted by al-Shāfi'ī, *Risāla*, ed. A. M. Shākir, 474, no. 1315: "Honour my Companions and those who follow them and those who follow these; after which untruth will appear", cf. Wensinck, *Handbook* 48B "Muḥammad admonishes. . .").

A few chronological points of reference will serve as rough definitions of the three groups which make up the Salaf:—a) The *ṣaḥāba* (or *aṣḥāb*), who date from the first conversions (at Mecca in 610 and Medina in June 621) until the death of Anas b. Mālik (91/710 or 93/712), considered to be the last survivor of the Prophet's Companions (cf. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAskalānī, *Iṣāba*, i, 138; Ibn Hazm, *Iḥkām*, iv, 152);—b) The *tābi'ūn*: a large number of these were contemporaries of the Prophet's Companions; some might even have been alive during the Prophet's lifetime but without satisfying the conditions which would have permitted them to be classed among the *ṣaḥāba*. The last of the *tābi'ūn* died around 180/796 (e.g.: Huṣḥaym b. Baṣḥr al-Sulamī, d. 183/799. He transmitted to Mālik and Sufyān al-Thawrī among others).—c) The *al-bā' al-tābi'īn*. There are no sufficiently precise criteria enabling us to define exactly this group of men; the reformists refer to them less frequently than to the other two, especially on the important question of ḥur'ānic exegesis (cf. *Tafsīr*, iii, 179, 208). In fact, they are essentially the most eminent disciples of the great *tābi'ūn*, *ḥibār al-tābi'īn* (like al-Kāsim b. Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr, 101/720; al-Sha'bi, d. 104/723; al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī,

d. 110/729; Ibn Sīrīn, d. 110/729). The middle of the 3rd/9th century can be taken as the *terminus ad quem* of this last group of Salaf. Also covered by the term Salaf are "the doctors of the second and third generations" (*Tafsīr*, ii, 82), notably the founders of the four Sunnī *madhabs* and a certain number of their contemporaries, the strongest religious personalities from the early days of Islam, such as al-Awzā'ī (d. 157/774), Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), al-Layṭ b. Sa'd (d. 175/791) and Ishāq b. Rāḥwayh (d. 238/853, cf. *Tafsīr*, vii, 552, viii, 453). Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) would appear to be one of the last representatives of the age of the Salaf.

In reformist usage, the Salaf are sometimes mentioned in opposition to the *Khalaf* or "later generations", under whose influence the message of Islam has been obscured, if not distorted, by innovation, the fanaticism of the Schools, and the mushrooming of sects (cf. *Tafsīr* viii, 269). This conception should appear simplistic, implying that reformists should cut themselves off from the cultural current which has never ceased to refresh the body of the *Umma* throughout the centuries. In fact the position of the Salafiyya is more subtle: outside the period of the Salaf defined above, the modern reformists do not refuse to take into consideration the contributions made by the "independent" (*mustakill*) doctors—independent of the Schools and Parties—who, following the example of the Salaf, were free from all sectarianism and all narrowmindedness, and whose only concern was to safeguard the integrity of the *Sunna* and the unity of the Community. Thus Abū Ishāq al-Shātibī (d. 790/1388) is highly esteemed by Rashīd Riḍā (cf. the eulogistic article that he devoted to him in *K. al-I'tisām*, Cairo 1332/1914, i, 1-9; *Tafsīr*, vi, 156-63, vii, 193). Moreover, the Salafiyya venerate a number of outstanding Sunnī teachers and mystics such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Djuwaynī (d. 438/1047), his son the Imām al-Ḥaramayn (d. 478/1085), and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), even though they came later than the Salaf (cf. *Tafsīr*, xi, 378). These they consider as "guides to salvation" (*a'immat al-hudā*), seeing them as bearers of the light which brought about the periodic revival of Muslim spirituality. In the line of such men who rejuvenated Islam and faithful transmitted the ideas of the Salaf is Muḥammad 'Abduh; to the supporters of modern reformism he is the master (*al-ustādh al-imām*) the one who really inaugurated the renewal of Islam at the dawn of the 20th century.

Fidelity to the moral and religious tradition of the Salaf is a fundamental demand of *islāh*. Besides the two sources, the reformists proclaim this tradition as their only basic point of reference, justifying their attitude by the following arguments:—a) *The Salaf received the sacred inheritance from the Prophet* (the dogmas of the faith, the form of worship), and transmitted it faithfully, in word and deed, *ḥawli^{an} wa-'amal^{an}* (*Tafsīr*, vi, 277). They are the guarantors of the *Sunna* (*ibid.*, ii, 30, 82), and their liturgical tradition must be adhered to as an ideal norm, in the sense that it actualizes the spirituality of the Prophet, and to imitate this must be the highest ambition of every Muslim.—b) *The Salaf best understood and followed the ḥur'ānic message*, as it was handed down to them fresh from the Revelation (*ghaḍḍan kamā unzila*). After the Prophet, they are most qualified to interpret the Scriptures (*Tafsīr*, iii, 178, 182, vi, 196; cf. R. Blachère, *Introd. au Coran*, 225 ff.). Their reading and their meditations on the Book are indispensable for a modern understanding of the Ḥur'ān, which must avoid being both too literal or too subjective—and thus arbitrary—



c) *The Salaf are the best source of information we have about the life of the Prophet and about the way he put the Revelation into practice.* On many factual points their unanimous accounts (*iḍmā'*) are irreplaceable, rounding off information given by the two sources. The Salaf thus provide the necessary framework for an understanding of the Revelation and the *Sunna*.

A complement to the *Sunna* and a source of inspiration in Islamic life (in spiritual matters as well as in secular acts), the tradition of the Salaf is more than an object of veneration for the modern reformists. The Salafiyya do not wish to be a group frozen in admiration of an ideal image of Islam reflected by the Salaf. They aspire rather to live Islam within modern society, in a simple and true manner, following the example of the Salaf. Moreover, for the theoreticians of *islāḥ*, this ideal expresses their desire to rebuild the Muslim personality, not by copying foreign values and cultures but by drawing from the moral and cultural tradition of early Islam. It is this ideal that Ibn Bādīs defended in his column in *Shihāb*: *Riḍā' al-Salaf wa-nisā'u-h* ("[famous] Men and Women in early Islam"): "Our aim is to make our readers aware of a number of our pious forefathers—men and women—underlining the eminent qualities they owed to Islam and the lofty acts they performed in its service; for their example can strengthen the hearts of Muslims, contribute to their moral improvement, inspire them with great projects, and breathe new life into them. There is no life for the generation of today without the life of the Salaf, which is nothing but their living history and the everlasting memory of them" (*Shihāb*, Jan. 1934, 14). In like manner, reformist authors tended to exploit systematically the historical and literary facts relating to the Salaf in order to point moral as well as social and political lessons. (Cf. the examples given in *Tafsīr*, iii, 92: 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, 374: Abū Ṭāḥa Zayd b. Sahl; 375: 'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar; 376: 'Abd Allāh b. Dja'far; vii, 21-23: 'Uthmān b. Ma'z'ūn and 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib; viii, 225: Zayd b. 'Alī and his companions, cited as martyrs (*fidā'iyyūn*) of religious and political *islāḥ*; x, 654-5: 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Awf; see also the examples presented in A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman*, 287 ff.; 'Ubāda b. al-Ṣāmit and his wife Umm Ḥarām, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, Bilāl b. Rabāḥ, al-Nu'mān b. 'Adī al-'Adawī; 325-6: Laylā al-Shifā' bint 'Amr). Biographical literature concerning the

beginnings of Islam (beyond that of the *Sīra* itself) became an inexhaustible mine of historical and moral meditation for the reformists (cf. the column of *Manār*: *Āthār al-salaf 'ibra li 'l-khalaf*: that of *Shihāb* (already referred to): *Riḍā' al-salaf wa-nisā'u-h* (from 1934 on); the lyrical and moralizing odes to the glory of the Patriarchal Caliphs like the 'Umarīyya (Feb. 1918, 190 lines) by Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm (d. 1932) and the 'Alawīyya (Nov. 1919, more than 300 lines) by Muḥammad 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib (d. 1931); Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, *Ma'a 'l-ra'īl al-awwal*, Cairo, 1378/1958).

The historico-cultural importance of the Salaf in the methodology of *islāḥ* is considerable. Even though the Salafiyya give priority to the two sources, they put forward the principle that the Revelation and the *Sunna* inaugurated a new order in human history, and that that order became a complete living reality in and through the acts of the Salaf. Thus the reformist conception of Islam could be summarized in a statement of the following type: "The constituents of Islam are the ḥur'ānīc revelation, Muḥammad's *Sunna*, and the tradition of the pious forefathers (*wa-mā kāna 'alayh al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*)", viewing this tradition from the aspect of its moral and dogmatic content (*Tafsīr*, vii, 143, 198, ix, 132, xi, 378; Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Feb. 1934, 99). Because they felt it was the concrete expression of the ideal "way" of Islam, the reformists continually cite the tradition of the Salaf in support of their missionary activity (*da'wa*) and their teaching in matters of ḥur'ānīc exegesis or social and political ethics. This fidelity to the Salaf governs one of the main doctrinal premises of *islāḥ*.

C.—THE PRINCIPAL DOCTRINAL POSITIONS.—*Islāḥ* aims at a total reform of Muslim life.

1.—For the reform of worldly matters, *islāḥ* employed oral teaching (*wa'z*, *irshād*) in mosques and through cultural circles well-disposed toward the Salafiyya movement. Screened by their educational and scholastic (*al-tarbiya wa 'l-ta'lim*) or charitable (*khayriyya*) works, these associations attempted to implement the great aims of the reformists. In addition, *islāḥ* was diffused by means of many publications and periodicals, some of which, like the *Manār* in the East (1898-1935), run by Raḥīd Riḍā, or the *Shihāb* in the Maghrib (1924-39), edited by 'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Bādīs, had a deep and lasting influence.

The general reformist themes propagated among the masses can be summarized as follows: the restora-

tion of worship to its original form (which entailed certain liturgical changes, minor in themselves, but extremely irritating to traditionalist Sunnīs); preaching against a host of practices which seemed religious but had no foundation either in the Prophet's *Sunna* or in the tradition of the Salaf (funeral rites such as the public recitation of the Kur'ān over the tomb, the celebration of the *mawlid* [q.v.] etc.); and warning against pious beliefs and practices which the Salafiyya felt bore traces of the survival of paganism or the manifestation of *shirk* [q.v.] (cult of the saints, invocation of the dead, etc.). The reformers also exhorted the faithful to unite, to worship in solidarity aside from the divergences of Schools and to overcome the traditional opposition between Sunnism and Shī'ism; and they encouraged the development of a moral censorship designed both to ensure the canonical obligation to obey God and eliminate Evil, and also to cleanse Muslim society of vice, gambling, the use of alcoholic beverages and drugs, etc. The education of Muslim men (and especially women) in elementary hygiene and domestic economy (including the encouragement to save) was important, as was the cultivation of a taste for order and work well done. Other educational aims were the awakening of the Muslims' intellectual curiosity, so that they might study modern science and foreign languages; and the support of projects for youth such as scouting, artistic activities, cultural activity within the many circles (*nādī*) and associations of Young Muslims (*djām'iyyat al-shubbān al-muslimīn*). All this comprised an attempt to hasten the birth of new Muslim men, capable of facing fearlessly—and without the risk of alienation—the problems of the contemporary world.

2.—*For theoretical reform.* It is important to stress that the principal reformist authors were above all men of action who did not have the time to elaborate well-developed doctrinal works. The main religious ideas of Muhammad 'Abduh are set out in his *Risālat al-tawhīd*, in 133 small pages. The rest of his teachings can be found scattered piecemeal through the bulky *Tafsīr* by Rashīd Riḍā, where his work cannot easily be distinguished from his disciples'. Al-Kawākibī (who died prematurely in 1902) produced no more than two essays: *Ṭabā'ī' al-istiḥdād* and *Umm al-kurā*, which contain only a small proportion of theoretical thought. The Algerian reformer, Ibn Bādīs, who, like 'Abduh, introduced many new ideas throughout his life, left no more than a series of articles of kūr'ānic commentary (that is, about 500 octavo pages), published in the *Shihāb* (cf. A. Merad, *Ibn Bādīs, commentateur du Coran*). There remains the considerable work of Rashīd Riḍā, in particular his *Tafsīr* (*Tafsīr al-Manār*), which is the most important source for the study of the dogmatic positions of modern *islāh*. The many secondary reformist authors simply developed the ideas of their masters when they were not simply imitating their writings and teaching.

The efforts of the Salafiyya centered particularly on criticism of the fashionable doctrines of their time, either on the grounds that they were a rigid form of classical doctrine (that of the Sunnī schools), or that they were rash analyses and formulations, the result of a modernism that was dubious in principle and incompatible with the criteria of orthodoxy which *islāh* had set up. At the same time, the reformists attempted to work out "ideal" Islamic positions, bearing in mind the objective facts given in the two sources and the fundamental conceptions of the Salaf; the latter were essentially viewed through the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya and his pupil Ibn

Kayyim al-Djāwziyya (d. 751/1350), whom they considered the soundest authorities on the tradition of the Salaf (cf. *Tafsīr*, i, 253; it is thanks to these two that the author adhered so serenely (*ima'anna ḥalībī*) to the doctrines attributed to the Salaf). From the critical works and commentaries of the reformists (cf. *Bibliography*) we can distinguish the following doctrinal positions:

1.—*Methodology.*—The dominant Sunnī doctrine based canonical knowledge (*ilm*) on four fundamental sources (*uṣūl* [q.v.]): the Kur'ān, the *Sunna*, the *idjma'* and the *idjtihād* (cf. al-Shāfi'ī, *Risāla*, 478-9, nos. 1329-2; J. Schacht, *uṣūl*, in *ET*¹; idem, *ḥikm*, in *ET*²). Starting from these four sources, juridical and moral rules (*ahkām*) are deduced according to well-defined criteria which are the subject-matter of the science of the *uṣūl*. *İslāh* adheres to the classical theory of the four sources (*Tafsīr* v, 187, 201, xi, 267), without accepting traditional criteria in their entirety (*ibid.*, v, 187, 201, 203, 208, 417). The reformist stance can be summarized under the following headings: the authority of the two Sources; the rejection of *taḥlīl*; a new conception of *idjtihād* and *idjma'*; and the necessary distinction between the *ibādāt* and the *ādāt*.

1.—*The two Sources* (Kur'ān and *Sunna*) constitute the basis of the whole legal system in Islam. Their authority frees Muslims from exclusive submission to traditional doctrinal authorities, thus effectively wiping out the divergences (*ikhtilāf*) between Schools (*madhāhib*), the secular opposition between Sunnīs and Shī'ism, and the hatred nurtured in Sunnī circles for sects felt to be heretical (particularly all Khāridjism, in its present form of the Ibādiyya [q.v.]). By returning to first principles, Muslims will be able to overcome the divisive effect of the Schools but will still be able to take up all that is best from each of the many contributions (Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, March 1936, 654, Nov. 1938, 230). This would permit, for example, the possibility of an eventual unification of Muslim legislation. By preaching tirelessly for a return to first principles, the reformists were led to voice severe criticism of the orthodox Schools and their teachers, the *fukahā* (cf. al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-kurā*, 72 ff.; Muh. 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawhīd*, 15, 101, (Fr. trans. 19, 107); Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, ii, 258-9, iii, 9-11, iv, 49, 280, vii, 145 and following references). In their eyes, the Schools generally identified themselves with trends hostile to reason and science (*Tafsīr*, ii, 91-3); they hindered the research carried out by *idjtihād* and consequently helped to stop the cultural progress of the Community; they in fact gave priority to the study of *fiqh* over knowledge based on the Kur'ān and on the Prophet's *Sunna* (*ibid.*, v, 106, 120, ix, 129-30, x, 429); they placed the authority of the "doctors" higher than the authority of the only legitimate and worthwhile *madhāb*: that of the Salaf (*ibid.*, ix, 133). By encouraging the unconditional submission of the masses to their doctors, the Schools ignored kūr'ānic teaching, which says that Muslims must cling together (*djām'iyya*) to the one and only rope of salvation, the rope of Allāh (*ḥabl Allāh*), which is the Kur'ān (cf. the commentary of Rashīd Riḍā on this kūr'ānic ref. (III, 98): *Tafsīr*, v, 20 ff.). The return to the two sources (and to the tradition of the Salaf) would thus be a unifying and reconciling factor for Muslims. Freed of their fanaticism and mutual prejudices, Muslims could reunite in the fundamental unity of their *Umma*, rediscovering their original fraternity, over and above their ethnic and cultural ties. (The theme of the return to first principles was a powerful argument in favour of pan-Islamism, an idea dear to the reformist authors).

Can the return to first principles advocated by the Salafiyya be seen as reactionary? The reformists were not trying to restore to the old symbols (such as *sunna*, *umma*, *djāmā'a*, *imām*, *dār al-islām*, *idjīmā'*, *idjitiḥād*) the exact same significance they had had at the time of the Salaf. Rather, such a return expresses their desire to take the two sources as an essential (but not exclusive) basis for their reflection, in order to solve the moral problems that the modern world poses to Muslims. The use to which they put certain symbols found in the Qur'ān or the *Sunna* sometimes corresponds to preoccupations arising from daily life in the modern world. Behind what appears to be a fundamentalist return to the sources of Islam, the Salafiyya are in fact attempting to work towards a moral and doctrinal renewal by searching for subtle concordances between the Scriptures and present-day realities (see, e.g., the concepts of *shūrā* (Qur'ān, II, 233; III, 159) and of *ulū 'l-amr* (Qur'ān, IV, 59) and their respective interpretations by Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr* ii, 414, iv, 199-205, v, 180-190). A logical consequence of the principle of a return to the sources is the rejection of *taḳlīd* [q.v.] and the search for new ways of practising *idjitiḥād*.

2.—*Taḳlīd*. The reformists vigorously criticized the spirit of servile dependance upon traditional doctrinal authorities (notably in the orthodox Schools). The concept of *taḳlīd* obviously does not apply either to the pious imitation of the Prophet, which is held to be a canonical obligation (cf. Qur'ān IV, 59, XXXIII, 21), nor to the trusting acceptance of the tradition of the Salaf, whose moral and doctrinal authority is loudly proclaimed by the reformists (see above). In these cases, the word *ittibā'* (active fidelity) to the traditions of both the Prophet and the Salaf was used instead of *taḳlīd*. (Cf. in this respect the distinction made by Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, v, 238). Such a fidelity regulates and inspires the general mission of *islāḥ*, which offers the imitation of the Prophet as an "ideal of knowledge and action" (H. Laouist, *Essai*, 226). For Ibn Bādīs, the better the imitation the better is the reformist mission (*da'wa*) accomplished (*Shihāb*, April 1935, 8). *Ittibā'* is the attempt to reach authenticity; it is the opposite of the spirit of speculation and innovation (*ibtidā'*), which is as reprehensible at a religious level as is the passive acceptance of the teachings of authority. In any case, *taḳlīd* is quite different from the attempt to model one's life on the exemplary lives (*ikhtidā'*) of people who, because of their piety or holiness, are worthy of imitation (*Tafsīr*, vi, 415). Finally, the considered acceptance of interpretations supplied by the most eminent *mudjtahid* cannot be described as *taḳlīd*, since they do not claim to be legislators (*shārī'ūn*) independent of God and His Prophet, but only sound guides to a better understanding of the divine Law and the *Sunna* (*ibid.*, v, 238). The same applies to the obedience which is normally due to the *ulū 'l-amr* (Qur'ān, IV, 59), who work together in explaining the Law, in applying it and, generally, in putting Qur'ānic values into practice at every level of Muslim life. The reformist criticism of *taḳlīd* is aimed both at mindless conformism and the deliberate support given to social and political structures which prevent progress and personal initiative in the name of a static vision of religion and culture. For the *muḥallid*, the reformists feel, religious life is merely the expression of acquired habits and the passive acceptance of the *status quo*; their worship is reduced to verbal formulae which have no profound meaning; and religious rites dwindle to mechanically

repeated acts which have no reforming and sanctifying value. Looked at in this light, *taḳlīd* is the opposite of the spiritual and ethical demands made by the Qur'ān.

The Qur'ān contains many statements condemning mindless submission to those who went before, to the "fathers" (*ābā'*), a theme much used by reformist writers: *Tafsīr*, i, 425, iv, 63 (the refusal to see *taḳlīd* as the distinctive mark of Islam); viii, 21, (ref. to *sūra* XC), ix, 570, x, 428 (*taḳlīd* is condemned by the Qur'ān); i, 425, ii, 83, vii, 143 (it is strongly discouraged by the Salaf and the first great thinkers); v, 296, viii, 30, 144 (it is a source of error); i, 448, iii, 236, v, 296 (it is an obstacle to personal meditation on Revelation); ii, 76, viii, 169, ix, 179, x, 432 (it encourages a new form of idolatry: the excessive veneration of authorities and masters); i, 429, iii, 202, 258, iv, 49, vii, 145 (it leads to sectarianism and fanaticism); ii, 76, 108, viii, 399 (it is a cause of disunion and weakness in the Community). Since it sets greater store on arguments from authority than on personal thought and experience, *taḳlīd* is contrary to the spirit of Islam, which recognizes in reasoning beings the faculty of taking decisions in all conscience (*ibid.*, xii, 220-1; see also Muḥammad Iḳbāl's remarks in *The Reconstruction...*, 125-9 [Fr. trans., 136-41]). The reformist argument makes continual appeals to this sort of objection when denouncing the illegitimate (*buḥlān*) and illicit (*ṭaḥrīm*) nature of *taḳlīd* and stressing its negative effects on Muslim teaching and ethics. *Taḳlīd* is also blamed for the cultural stagnation of Islam and the passive submission of the Muslim masses to traditional religious structures (*'ulamā'* and *shaykhs* of the brotherhoods); cf. *Tafsīr*, iii, 325-7, x, 425-35, xii, 221; Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Waḥda al-islāmiyya*, *ḥassim*; Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Nov. 1932, 552-57; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman*, 275-6. In the reformist view, the concept of *taḳlīd* inevitably brings to mind that of *idjitiḥād*, with which it forms one of the antithetical couples (*taḥḥid/shirk*, *sunna/bid'a*, *ittibā'/ibtidā'*, *salaf/khālaf*) around which the doctrine of *islāḥ* is firmly articulated.

3.—*Idjitiḥād*. *Islāḥ* affirms the necessity and legitimacy of the use of the *idjitiḥād*, which Rashīd Riḍā sees as "a life-force in religion" (*ḥayāt al-dīn*, *Tafsīr*, ii, 399). The fiction of the "closing of the gate" of *idjitiḥād* (from the 4th/10th century on) is thus abandoned and with it the whole heritage of interdictions and myths which weighed heavily on the Muslim conscience for so long. But the reformists did not regard the opening of the mind to *idjitiḥād* as absolute freedom for the critical spirit to call everything into question. Complete liberty of conscience in religious matters would lead to speculation without end (*ibid.*, viii, 317), which was not what the Salafiyya wanted. Conservative Sunnism nevertheless blamed *islāḥ* for encouraging innovation and favouring doctrinal "anarchy" (*ibid.*, ii, 273, xi, 253). The theme of *taḳlīd* has been a constant source of misunderstanding between the reformists and their traditionalist adversaries, because neither agreed on the definition of this principle nor on the extent to which it can be applied. The traditionalists, who thought of religion (in its broadest sense) as a divine work which is perfectly complete (Qur'ān, V, 5), were afraid that modern criticism might use *idjitiḥād* to undermine the essential foundations of Islam. But the reformist conception of *idjitiḥād* also had its limiting conditions.

Firstly, *islāḥ* defined an intangible sphere, which included the dogmas of the faith (*'aḳā'id*), fundament-

al worship (*'ibādāt*) and canonical prohibitions (*tahrim dīnī*), which are all based on the Scriptures, either because of their explicit and formal nature or because of the irrefutable authenticity of their interpretation (*mā huwa kaḥq'i 'l-riwāya wa 'l-dalāla: Tafṣīr*, i, 118 (bis), xi, 268, 265; *al-Wahda al-islāmiyya*, 136). In this domain there is no room for *idjtihād* (*Tafṣīr*, v, 211, viii, 217, x, 432, xi, 268), for it would be intolerably presumptuous to attempt to question fundamental religious facts, which form "a divine institution, revealed by God" (*ibid.*, ii, 18, x, 432). Apart from these sacred matters, *islāh* permits the use of *idjtihād*, while placing it on two distinct planes, each with a particular significance.

a)—As an effort to understand the two sources, *idjtihād* is part of the right—and duty—of every Muslim to seek to understand by himself Revelation and the *Sunna* (*ibid.*, ii, 399). One of the fundamental ideas of reformist preaching was that Muslims must feel personally concerned with the Word of God and the teaching of the Prophet which illuminates it. Constant meditation on the Scriptures, patient efforts to analyse and understand all the resources that it offers, should permit every Muslim to steep himself in the divine message and draw from it principles of moral and spiritual conduct (*hidāya*). This purely interior form of *idjtihād* helps to nourish the Muslim's spirituality and guide his conscience in his moral judgements and practical choices. Its implications are largely personal (cf. *Tafṣīr*, i, 118, the individual *idjtihād* in matters of worship, *'ibādāt shakhsiyya*). *Idjtihād* is also very important for the Community, which should employ a constant effort to interpret the two sources to determine the general principles of its "politics" (social, economic, foreign, etc.), in accordance with the fundamental commands of the Qur'an and the *Sunna*.

b)—In so much as it is a constructive effort with implications both for the Community and in practical affairs, at a legislative rather than dogmatic level, *idjtihād* comes under the authority of the *ulū 'l-amr* [q.v.]. These latter are the legitimate holders of authority (Qur'an, IV, 59) and because of their responsibilities, their religious knowledge, and their particular abilities are in charge of "binding and unbinding" (*ahl al-hall wa 'l-'aḥd*), that is the right to decide in the name of the Community and in its best interests. (On the definition and role of the *ulū 'l-amr*, cf. H. Laoust, *Essai*, 596, and *Traité de Droit Public d'Ibn Taymiyya* (on the latter's point of view); al-Kawākibi, *Umm al-ḥurā*, 58; Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafṣīr* ii, 492, iii, 11-12, iv, 199-205 (important), v, 180-1 Muhammad 'Abduh's position), 211-2, vii, 140, 198, viii, 102, xi, 164). The acts of the *ulū 'l-amr* should aim to bring about the moral good (*islāh*) and material welfare (*maṣālīh*) of the Community. Their competence extends to affairs that are normally the responsibility of political leaders, but does not include matters of worship and personal status (*ibid.*, v, 211). In these matters, *idjtihād* would constitute a veritable heresy (*ibid.*, xi, 253). Muslims could refuse to recognize the *ulū 'l-amr* (political and religious chiefs) who attempted to use their *idjtihād* in the sacred domain (*ibid.*, viii, 308), which is the "right of God" (*ḥaḥḥ Allāh*) over men (*ibid.*, viii, 288). Hence those attempts at *idjtihād* suggested by some Arab heads of state in order to reform certain aspects of Muslim personal status which they considered incompatible with the spirit of contemporary civilization were invalid. In all that concerns canonical prescriptions which are authentically founded on the two sources, the role of the *ulū 'l-amr* is essentially

to safeguard orthodoxy, by making sure that the *Sunna*, as it was formulated by the Salaf, is respected in its entirety (*ibid.*, iii, 11-12). This is a natural corollary of the reformist doctrinal principle maintaining that *idjtihād* is incompatible with certainty (*yakīn*) emanating from the absolutely evident facts of the Scriptures (*ibid.*, ii, 18, 109). The Salafiyya only allow the use of *idjtihād* in the absence of any explicit scriptural reference (*naṣṣ*), prophetic tradition (*sunna*) or general consensus (*idjmā'*)—in this case the consensus of the Prophet's Companions—that would resolve a given problem (*ibid.*, viii, 219).

Given this important restriction, we can distinguish two types of problems to which the *idjtihād* of the *ulū 'l-amr* is normally applicable. i)—Purely secular business (administrative organization, scientific and technical questions, military and diplomatic affairs, etc.). In these fields, the *ulū 'l-amr* are quite free to choose and decide, in so far as their choices are governed by the overriding interests of the Community, in line with the specific goals of Islam. ii)—On the other hand, in business which has some connection with canonical doctrine, the *idjtihād* of the *ulū 'l-amr* could necessitate the interpretation of Qur'anic texts whose apparent sense is not certain, *ḥannī al-dilāla* (*Tafṣīr* ii, 109). In this case, to be acceptable, the interpretation must lead to conclusions that are in agreement with the two sources in spirit and letter, for it is understood that *idjtihād* can only be used in the context of the two sources and can only refer to the textual sources and different indications (*dalā'il*, *ḥarā'in*) that they offer. It is a basic principle in *islāh* that consideration of the best interests of the *Umma* would never result in solutions incompatible with the spirit, and even more, the objective facts of the Qur'an and the *Sunna*.

In this light, *idjtihād* is not unlike the method of *ḥiyās* [q.v.] as it is defined, for example, in the *Risāla* of al-Shāfi'ī (cf. J. Schacht, *Origins*, 122 ff.). *Islāh* denounces the "false *idjtihād* and the bad *ḥiyās*" (*Tafṣīr*, iii, 238, v, 203), which would allow the incorporation into religious law (*shar'*) of elements based merely on individual opinion (*ra'y* [q.v.]) or on more or less arbitrary preferences (*istiḥsān* [see ἰστίησαν and ἰστίηλη]). In religious matters *ra'y* is held to be a sort of "calamity" (*baliyya*), for it only serves to hide dangerous innovations (*ibid.*, viii, 398). While the reformists are very suspicious of *ḥiyās*, *ra'y* and *istiḥsān* according to the technical use of the *fuḥahā'*, they nevertheless accept these very modes of reasoning and judgement in certain clearly laid-down conditions (e.g., the *ra'y* of the most eminent religious men among the Companions (*'ulamā' al-ṣaḥāba*); explanatory *ra'y* on the subject of Qur'anic exegesis; the *ra'y* of the members of the *shūrā* (*djamā'at al-shūrā*), those responsible for the temporal affairs of the Community (*ibid.*, vii, 164)). On the different aspects of this question cf. *Tafṣīr* vii, 164 (on the recommended *ra'y*, *maḥmūd*); vii, 190 (on the acceptable *ḥiyās*, *ṣaḥīḥ*); vii, 167 ff. (on the evil of rejecting *ḥiyās* totally [cf. Ibn Ḥazm, *Iḥkām*, vii, 53 ff., viii, 2 ff.]) or of using it without restriction or intelligence). Throughout this debate, Rashīd Riḍā adopts—*grosso modo*—the neo-Hanbalite point of view, according to Ibn Qayyim al-Djauziyya (*I'lām al-Muwakkhi'in*). In short, *ra'y* and *ḥiyās* are only particular aspects of *idjtihād* and, like the latter, are only acceptable in matters outside worship (*'ibādāt*). When determining rules and legal statutes (*aḥkām*), *idjtihād* in all its forms is only to be used when there are no antecedents in either the Qur'an or the *Sunna* nor in the irrefutable

practice of the Patriarchal Caliphs (*Tafsīr*, vii, 164). Beyond the attempt at personal interpretation of the divine Word, and the desire to be open to the grace (*ḥudā*) which flows from it, reformist doctrine limits *idjīhād* to the type exercised by the *ūlū 'l-amr* in public affairs of a secular nature. But so that it should not be a source of quarrel and conflict, the *idjīhād* of the *ūlū 'l-amr* must be derived from mutual consultation (*shūrā*) in accordance with the ethical demands of the *Qur'ān* (XLII, 36). The Community is not bound by the personal and maybe even contradictory opinions of individual *muḍjītahids*. Its acceptance by the *ūlū 'l-amr* is a condition *sine qua non* of the validity of their *idjīhād*. Moreover, from the reformist point of view, this represents the most perfect form of *idjīmā'* [q.v.], by means of which the *Umma* will be able to solve the innumerable problems of its adaptation to the realities of the modern world.

4.—*Idjīmā'*. On this point (as on *idjīhād*), the reformist position is very different from the doctrine of the classical theoreticians of the *uṣūl* (cf. al-Shāfi'i, *Risāla*, 471 ff.; Ibn Ḥazm, *Iḥkām*, iv, 132-235 (a criticism of Ḥanafī, Mālikī, and Shāfi'i ideas on the subject); H. Laoust, *Contribution à une étude de la méthodologie canonique d'Ibn Taymiyya*, Cairo, 1939; idem, *Essai*, 139 ff.; J. Schacht, *Origins*, 82-94; Muḥammad Ikbāl, *Reconstruction...*, 164 ff.; L. Gardet, *Introduction...*, 403 ff.; idem, *La Cité Musulmane*, 119-29; see also: *IDJIMĀ'*). *Idjīmā'* is recognized as third of the fundamental sources of Islam (and not only of the "Law"; cf. al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḥurā*, 104; *Tafsīr*, v, 187, xi, 267); but the reformists do not accept the traditional classification and formulations which arose from it (*Tafsīr*, v, 203-9). For them, classical conceptions of the subject are not justified by the two sources, (*ibid.*, v, 213) even though the idea of *idjīmā'* is implicitly contained in the *Qur'ān* (IV, 115) and the *Sunna* (cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 48A; Ibn Ḥazm, *Iḥkām*, iv, 132 ff.). This methodological principle must not be defined in terms of the concept of "unanimity" (*idjīmā'*) but rather in terms of that of "community" (*djāmā'a*), the latter being understood as "the legitimate custodians of authority" (*ūlū 'l-amr*) instead of in the usual sense of the Muslim community as a whole (*Tafsīr*, v, 213-4). Thus the reformists do not confer on *idjīmā'* the status of either a general consensus of the Community (cf. al-Shāfi'i, *Risāla*, 403, no. 1105 and 471 ff.), or that of a unanimous agreement of the *muḍjītahids* of a given period on a given question (*ibid.*, v, 417). Like the doctrinal line of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and the neo-Ḥanbalite school, the Salafiyya limit (*ḥaṣara*) *idjīmā'* at a canonical level to that of the Prophet's Companions (al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḥurā*, 67, 103; *Tafsīr*, ii, 108, 454, v, 187, 206, vii, 118, viii, 254, 428). Any *idjīmā'* later than the era of the Companions is without value, particularly if it ratifies doctrines that contradict the tradition of the latter: *idjīmā' al-mukhālīfīn* (*Tafsīr*, v, 206, vii, 198). Just as matters concerning worship (*'ibādāt*) are to be judged with reference to the consensus of the Companions (including, if need be, that of the *tābi'ūn*), which is the sole criterion of orthodoxy, the agreement of the *ūlū 'l-amr* on secular matters is a criterion of legality, for they are the custodians of the Community's legitimacy (*ibid.*, iii, 12: the *ūlū 'l-amr* are those whom the *Umma* recognizes as having controlling power over the leaders and their public acts, *taḍjī' aluḥum musaytirīn 'alū ḥukhāmihā wa-ahkāmihā*). The obedience due to the *ūlū 'l-amr* (by virtue of sūra IV, 59, constantly invoked by the

reformists) is justified not by the argument of infallibility (*'isma* [q.v.]) but by considerations of public interest (*maṣlaḥa*; *ibid.*, v, 208). To summarize reformist thought on the matter, Rashīd Riḍā defines the consensus of the *ūlū 'l-amr* as the "true *idjīmā'* that we hold to be one of the bases of our Law (*shari'a*)" (*ibid.*, v, 190).

In the absence of any consultative system in Islam that would enable the function of the *shūrā* to be exercised at Community level, most reformist authors have felt the need to fill the gap by using *idjīmā'*, modernizing its form and content. But the thinking of the Salafiyya on this theme was never sufficiently elaborated for us to be able to define a coherent reformist doctrine on the practical application of *idjīmā'* in the contemporary Muslim world. Muḥammad Ikbāl (1934) expressed the wish that the *idjīmā'* should be organized in the form of "a permanent legislative institution" (*Reconstruction...*, 164). Rashīd Riḍā (1922) considered the idea of using the *Djāmā'a*, a consultative body appointed to assist the supreme head (*al-imām al-a'ṣam*) of the Community (cf. H. Laoust, *Le Califat dans la doctrine de Rashīd Riḍā*, 1938, 21 ff.), but such a notion has meaning only within the perspective of a restoration of the Caliphate. With greater realism, Ibn Bādīs sets aside the problem of the Caliphate ("that vain fancy") and suggests the establishment of a *Djāmā'at al-Muslimīn*, a sort of permanent assembly composed of men of learning and experience, which would be designed to study specifically Muslim problems in order to find Islamic solutions. This important moral and religious body, acting in the name of the whole Community, would serve no one state and would be of a totally apolitical nature, so that its essential independence and liberty would be guaranteed (cf. A. Merad, *Réformisme*, 376 ff.; idem, *Ibn Bādīs Commentat.*, Chap. IV).

Though they never managed to agree on the practicalities of its establishment, the reformists did tend to see the institutionalization of *idjīmā'* as a decisive step in the evolution of the *Umma* in accordance with Islamic principles and the ideals of the Salafiyya. All who wrote on these lines held in common the idea that the *Djāmā'a* would be the privileged setting of the Community's *idjīmā'*. It would play two roles: at a religious level, it would effect regulations by stating the orthodox position on matters that gave rise to serious disagreement (*ikhtilāf*); in secular affairs, it would be the instigator of action, through applying the principle of *idjīhād* in the vast area within its competence. It would thus work towards preventing any confusion between the respective levels of the *'ibādāt* and the *'ādāt*, and would contribute to encouraging the free enquiry that the Community requires in the spheres of applied science and material progress.

5.—*The distinction between the 'ibādāt and the 'ādāt*. Following the neo-Ḥanbalī school (cf. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal; H. Laoust, *Essai*, 247-8, 444), modern *islāh* tends to make a clear distinction between the concerns of the *'ibādāt* [q.v.] and those of the *'ādāt*. Once again they justify their stand by the principle that in matters of worship everything has been completely and definitely decided by God (*Qur'ān*) and the Prophet (*Sunna*); for the rest, that is to say everything concerned with the organization of material life, the *ūlū 'l-amr* are free to come to their own decisions (see above: *idjīhād*).

a)—The *'ibādāt* come under commands (or interdictions) originating from the *Qur'ān* or from formal prescriptions laid down by the Prophet. They cover

all acts (including those of worship) and observances (of *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām* [q.v.]) which constitute the service of God (*ta'abbud*). It is out of the question for anybody to introduce the slightest innovation, either because of an *idjithād* or out of simple religious zeal. The fact of recognizing the inalterable quality of the *'ibādāt*, the very centre of faith, is itself an act of fidelity in what the Believers hold in certainty from God and his Prophet; it is the sign of a sincere and total belief in the latter's *Sunna*.

b)—The *'ādāt* (habits, customs, usage) cover a vast field of "earthly affairs" (*umūr dunyawīyya*) "which are individual or communal, particular or general" (Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, vii, 140), and above all affairs of a political and legal nature (*ibid.*, iii, 327, vii, 140, 200) which vary according to time and place. It is thus not a matter merely of the traditional legal rules (*mu'āmalāt*) or matters of "customary right", as the term *'āda* [q.v.] is understood in the usual classical sense of *fiḥh*. In the domain of the *'ādāt*, the reformists counsel tolerance (*'afw*) and claim for the *ūlu 'l-amr*, if not for private individuals, freedom of decision and the free exercise of *idjithād* (al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḥurā*, 67; *Manār*, iv, 210, vii, 959; *Tafsīr*, iii, 327, vii, 140-41, 191).

By virtue of this distinction, the reformists showed a prudent reserve about everything that has not been expressly decided by God or prescribed by the Prophet. For Rashīd Riḍā that which has not been prohibited by God cannot be prohibited by Man; that which God has made licit, Man cannot make illicit (*Tafsīr*, vii, 169); that which God has passed over in silence must be held to be tolerable, *'afw* (*ibid.*, iii, 328, vii, 169). The "wise men" of the religion have no right to make things permitted or forbidden. Their role is simply to put into practice the revealed Law (*sharī'a*): in this function only is obedience due to them. As for the *ḥur'ān*ic or prophetic references to certain secular matters (the use of food and remedies, etc.), they cannot be taken as binding: they are simply "suggestions" about what is preferable and not canonical prescriptions, *irshād lā tashrī'* (*ibid.*, vii, 201).

The distinction between the *'ibādāt* and the *'ādāt* permitted the Salafiyya to condemn the proliferation of devotional practices and interdictions propagated throughout the centuries in the name of Sūfism and eventually adopted by popular religion, even though they are not based on the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunna*. It enabled them, moreover, to point to their pruning of classical judicial and moral doctrine (by means of *fatwās*) and the reduction of traditional observance, in support of their claim to be the apostles of a disciplined and discreet religious temper, which they believed to be closer to the spirit of moderation that had characterized authentic Islam (the "gentle religion", *al-hanifiyya al-samī'a*), and more in harmony with the modern world. This distinction would also encourage a more tolerant view of local legal and social usage through classifying them as *'ādāt*, and permit the toning down of doctrinal differences (*ikhtilāf*) between the important currents in the Islamic world; perhaps it would also weaken the religious quarrels inherited from old schisms. Taken to its logical conclusion, this attitude would make it possible to envisage calmly the coexistence—in the bosom of the *Umma*—of different political, socio-economic and ideological systems, provided that the fundamental unity of Muslims in faith and worship was safeguarded and their common attachment to the essential content of Islamic law (*sharī'a*) unimpaired.

However, such a distinction between the *'ibādāt* and *'ādāt* has more of an apologetic value than any real practical implication. The fragmentary (and rather vague) notions on this subject put forward by Rashīd Riḍā and al-Kawākibī do not enable us to make an exact analysis of which aspects of traditional Muslim legislation must be considered fundamental, and thus untouchable, and which can be subsumed under the *'ādāt*. The postulated tolerance in matters of *'ādāt* is itself ambiguous, because of the restrictive conditions—derived from the *Qur'ān*—which were put forward by the Salafiyya each time they were obliged to define their political, economic, social or cultural standpoints (although these are, in theory, the field in which *'ādāt* can be used). In the reformist perspective, indeed, there are few matters that can be envisaged independently of the moral commands and general principles contained in Revelation and the *Sunna*; and whatever creative activity is envisaged, its goal must be examined in the light of the ethical and religious criteria of the two sources. *Islāh* admits of the possibility of adapting Muslim institutions and life to the realities of the modern world, so long as this adaptation does not result in the destruction of the fundamental values contained in the two sources. Thus, on the subject of feminism and the relations between the two sexes, the Salafiyya declare themselves favourable to the emancipation of Muslim women, but not to the extent that the liberalization of their legal status would come into conflict with the legal dispositions established in the *Qur'ān*, or the family and sexual ethics of Islam (cf. on this subject, *Tafsīr*, xi, 283-87: "Islam confers on women all human, religious and civil rights"; Rashīd Riḍā, *Nida' li 'l-djins al-latīf*, Cairo 1351/1932; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman*, 315-31 ("Les Réformistes et le Féminisme")).

Although they claim the necessity of distinguishing between profane and religious matters, between man's relations with God and merely human activities (which are not ruled by scriptural commands), the Salafiyya did not make any decisive contribution to the separation of theology and law. From their point of view, the ambiguity of the relationship *dīn/sharī'a* (which they never really attempted to clarify) makes any systematic criticism of traditional legal and moral doctrine that attempts to establish a clear-cut distinction between purely religious and social matters extremely difficult and *a priori* suspect. (It is worth noting the vigorous reaction of the reformists against the attempts made by 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq (1888-1968), in his *al-Islām wa-ṣul al-hukm*, Cairo 1343-44/1925, to dissociate institutional and political problems from moral and theological ones; cf., Kerr, *Islamic Reform*, 179 ff.). Rashīd Riḍā notes in passing the respective values of the concepts *dīn* and *sharī'a*, which he considers it unjustifiable to confuse (*Tafsīr*, vi, 147), but he does not draw any logical conclusion from the distinction. The distinction *dīn/sharī'a* (which is no less vital than that between the *'ibādāt* and the *'ādāt*) could have had important consequences had it been the point of departure for serious research into the possibilities of rigorously limiting the field of application of "religious law", and thus removing from the "sacred" domain everything that did not have a fundamental link with belief or worship and should therefore come under *idjithād*. It was left to Modernism (*uḍjdād* [q.v.]) to undertake this research (cf., e.g., the essays of Muḥammad Aḥmad Khalaf Allāh, in particular his *al-Kur'ān wa-mushkilāt ḥayātīnā al-mu'āsira* (Cairo 1967), in

which he proclaims the legitimacy of "a new interpretation of the fundamental principles of the *shari'a*, in the light of modern experience" (31). Incomplete though it be, the distinction between the *'ibādāt* and the *'ādāt* suggests a need for rationality and a desire to be pragmatic, which served the Salafiyya as an argument against the stubborn conservatism of the traditionalists (*djumūd*) and in support of the broadmindedness of *islāh* on the subject of progress and the modern world. At the same time it is a reply to those who preach out-and-out modernism, to the detriment of fidelity to authentic Islam (as it was illustrated by the tradition of the Salaf). The reformists see in this modernism a renunciation of the "spirit of compromise" which their apologetics present as the ideal tendency of Islam.

II—Apologetics.—Alongside criticism of the traditional aspects of Islam as they appear in conservative Sunnism, in the magical and superstitious beliefs of popular religion and in the religious systems of the brotherhoods, apologetics form an important part of the principal reformist works. Though centred on internal problems of Muslim society, and often argued with missionary zeal, reformist apologetics are also addressed to the "adversaries" of Islam either directly (cf. Muḥammad 'Abduh, *al-Islām wa 'l-radd 'alā muntakidih*, art. of 1900, Cairo 1327/1909 (Fr. trans., *Tal'at Harb, L'Europe et l'Islam*, Cairo 1905); idem, *al-Islām wa 'l-Naṣrāniyya*, art. of 1901, in *Manār*), or indirectly, in the form of warnings to Muslims against the seductions of Western civilization and ideologies. In both cases, the reformists attempted to demonstrate the excellence of Islam, as a "religion", as an ethical code, and as a legal, social and political system. Such apologetics develop along the following broad lines:

1.—*The liberating message of Islam*.—a. As a spiritual message. Here the argument is confined essentially to the exaltation of *tawhīd* [q.v.] as a principle of human liberation. Moral liberation: the affirmation of divine unity abolishes all worship that is not directed to God (the Unique), and all pretension to infallibility, since the only infallible source is the Revelation and the Prophet, who is inspired by God (this argument is elsewhere used to refute *taḥlīd* [q.v.], to the extent that the latter supposes submission to an authority which is believed, or pretends to be, infallible). On the other hand, the affirmation of divine transcendence condemns any domination based on the principle of intercession (*shafā'a* [q.v.]). Consequently, *tawhīd* denies any legitimacy to intermediary structures between man and God (as in institutional Churches), and destroys any need for the belief in the mediating function of certain categories of men (saints, mystics, etc.). Social Liberation: belief in the omnipotence of God is the basis of men's equality, for all men are equally subject to God and all men participate equally in the eminent dignity of their condition (cf. Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawhīd*, 155-6; Fr. trans., 106; Eng. trans., 125); it emancipates minds from all resigned or passive submission, either to arguments based on authority (*taḥlīd*), or to a status of inferiority or slavery imposed by the "great" (cf. *Kur'ān*, XXXIII, 67, XXXIV, 31-4; *alladhīn ustud'ifū*). The form of worship itself (common prayer, pilgrimage, etc.) underlines the egalitarian character of Islam.—b. The liberating message of Islam is also illustrated by the ethics of the *Kur'ān* and the *Sunna* which accept the fundamental unity of mankind and reject all discrimination based on differences of race or social condition (cf. Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawhīd*,

172; Fr. trans., 116-7; Eng. trans., 135; *Tafsīr*, 448 ff.; an identical position in Muḥammad Iḳbāl, *Reconstruction* 89; Fr. trans., 103).

2.—*The universal quality of Islam*.—a. As a religion (*dīn*). Reformist apologetics merely take up the traditional theme of the universality of Muḥammad's mission (*'umūm al-ba'tha*). For the Prophet was "elected to guide all nations towards Good (. . .) and call all men to a belief in the One God" (Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawhīd*, 139; Fr. trans., 95; Eng. trans., 114; cf. also, *Tafsīr*, vii, 610, on sūra VI, 90). Like many other Muslim thinkers in our own time, reformist authors believe that Islam is the perfect universal religion, since it incorporates what is essential in previous revelations (and especially Judaism and Christianity) and perfects their message (cf. Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawhīd*, 166 ff., Fr. trans., 112 (bottom) ff.; Eng. trans., 132 ff.; *Tafsīr* . . ., x, 448-456).—b. As a social, legal and political system (*shari'a*). The reformists proclaim the excellence, eternal nature and universal character of Islamic law, in opposition to human legislation, which is always imperfect, despite constant revision and correction. The *shari'a*—at least in those parts that are based on the Revelation—draws its essence from divine wisdom; it is thus the legislation best suited to the needs (*maṣāliḥ*) of men (*baṣhar*) in all places and at all times (Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Jan. 1934, 57; *Tafsīr*, vi, 146) for it envisages man's well-being from two points of view, those of earthly happiness and of their future salvation (an idea dear to the reformists and developed at great length by Rashīd Riḍā, *Manār*, i, (1898), 1, v, (1902), 459-65; *Tafsīr*, i, 11, ii, 330-41, x, 210, 437; cf. also Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawhīd*, 124, 169; Fr. trans., 84, 115; Eng. trans., 104, 134). This does not mean that the Salafiyya think of Muslim legislation as a closed system, sufficient unto itself in its definitive truth and perfection. Though they believe that certain rulings of the *shari'a* (e.g., the personal status of woman) are ideal norms, which neither the old legislations (of the biblical sort for example), nor modern legislation (inspired by western concepts) are capable of matching, they do not dismiss the idea that Muslims can copy certain doctrines upheld in advanced countries. However, the Salafiyya refuse to admit that all aspects of western progress are good, and that one has to accept *en bloc* the triumphant civilizations of Europe or America, for fear of seeming reactionary (Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Jan. 1932, 11). Moreover, the *ūlu 'l-amr* ought to co-operate in the adaptation of Muslim legislation (by means of reciprocal consultation (*shūrā*) and *idjtiḥād*), taking into account new realities, but respecting absolutely the fundamental aspects of the Law and observing the general ethics of Islam. The Salafiyya constantly repeat that in areas of every-day life, Islam gives man entire freedom (*ṣawwāḍ*) to act according to his well-being in the world (*Tafsīr*, ii, 205; ref. to the *ḥadīth*: "You are best placed to judge worldly affairs", vi, 140; Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, Oct. 1930, 70). From the preceding, the reformists drew arguments to establish the liberal nature of Islam and to justify its ability to adapt (not, of course, as a *dīn*, but as *shari'a*) to all human situations at any time and in any place.

3.—*The liberal spirit of Islam*.—Outside matters of faith and the unalterable elements of the *shari'a* (both of which were expressly laid down in Revelation), Islam assigns no limit to the exercise of reason. This aspect of reformist apologetics, which has been mainly dealt with by Muḥammad 'Abduh

(*Risālat al-tawhīd*, *passim*), Rashīd Riḍā (cf. J. Jomier, *Le Comment. coran. du Manār*, chap. III), and Ibn Bādīs (cf. A. Merad, *Ibn Bādīs, Commentat. du Coran*, chap. II, Vth), will not be discussed in detail here. On the problem of faith and reason ('aql), the reformist position is that the Qur'ānic message addresses itself both to the conscience (*wuḍiʿān*) and to the mind (*fikr*), and requires not only acceptance by faith but understanding by means of reason. If the Qur'ān limits reason, it is only in those areas which are part of the unknowable (*ghayb* [q.v.]), and to prevent man from falling into inevitable errors and attributing to God things which are not part of His Being.

The reformists frequently invoke the argument of reason in order to maintain not only that Islam puts no obstacles in the way of intellectual research and the exercise of 'aql, but even that it positively encourages both and incites men to cultivate the gift of intelligence, which is a God-given privilege (Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, March 1931, 78 ff., ref. to sūra XVII, 70). 'Aql in reformist usage is not exactly the knowing consciousness or reasoning reason, which seeks to reach truth independently of faith and revelation. Orthodox reformist writers understand 'aql in opposition to blind passion (*hawā*), which smother the voice of "healthy nature" (*fiṣṭa* [q.v.]), and doubtless in opposition to the (hyper-) critical mind. The 'aql is not a man who can perform speculative exercise with ease and is dedicated exclusively to the cult of reason, but a man capable of judicious balanced thinking, which implies a spirit of moderation, even a certain reluctance to attempt to submit everything to one's judgment, and to explain everything solely by the light of one's intelligence.

The debate on the subject of faith and reason points to one of the contradictions of reformist thought: i.e., its desire to adopt a language, and sometimes even intellectual methods, that are in conformity with the modern mind, while at the same time clinging to principles and positions which they feel are in perfect agreement with the doctrines of the Salaf. It is notable in this respect that the liberal tendencies of certain reformist writers are held back by the fear that reasoning reason will encroach on areas reserved to faith, and the temptations of human passion (*hawā*) will conquer progressively the directing principles (*hudā*) of Revelation (cf. *Tafsīr*, v, 416: opposition *hudā/hawā*).

However, the reformists are not particularly interested in theological and philosophical speculation. Apart from the *Risālat al-tawhīd* by Muḥammad 'Abduh (which describes a fundamental schema rather than a theological totality), and the *Risālat al-shirk* by Mubārak al-Mīlī (which is a refutation of Maraboutic beliefs), no truly elaborated theology can be found in the doctrinal system of the Salafiyya. They were satisfied with massive affirmations, based on texts in the Qur'ān, which are, from their point of view, decisive arguments. Thus they never fail to underline everything in the Qur'ān which seems to encourage intellectual research and constitutes an incentive for the exploration of nature and its exploitation in the service of man. They underline those parts of the Revelation that encourage men to think, to understand things, to persuade others by means of demonstrative proofs (*burhān*); they make the utmost use of all the resources of the Qur'ānic vocabulary which deal with knowledge and the activity of the mind (cf., the *Concordantiae* by G. Flügel, in which we can see the richness of the themes formed from the radicals 'br, 'kl, 'lm, 'hkm, 'fkr,

fkh); in short they attempt to show that Islam lets human reason play an important role, and that it encourages (in theory, if not in practice) human progress in the domains of knowledge and civilization (cf. the particularly vigorous doctrinal statement by Rashīd Riḍā in *Tafsīr*, 244 ff., under the eloquent title: *al-Islām dīn al-fiṭra al-salīma wa 'l-'aql wa 'l-fikr wa 'l-'ilm wa 'l-hikma wa 'l-burhān wa 'l-hudūdja*).

The theme of knowledge and civilization plays an important role in reformist propaganda (cf. J. Jomier, *Le Comment. coran. du Manār*, chap. IV; A. Merad, *Ibn Bādīs, commentat. du Coran* chap. IV, IIIrd). Thanks to the intelligence with which God has endowed him, man can rise above erroneous belief and superstition, cultivate the sciences and adopt healthy beliefs: using it, he should also be able to increase his power over nature, to profit by the various resources of Creation, in order to achieve material power ('izz, *kuwwa*) and know a happy moral well-being. Presented in this way by the reformists, Islam appears as a religion which is particularly attentive to the moral and material progress of humanity. It was therefore an effective refutation of arguments of the type put forward by Renan (Islam is contrary to the scientific spirit) and useful in revealing the inadequacy of Marxist-orientated criticism (Islam is a reactionary doctrine). The reformists deplore the judging of Islam by the behaviour and excesses of some of its followers who distort its image through their innovations, by superstitious beliefs born of ignorance, by the imposture of false "scholars", and by the immorality of its politicians (cf. the objections enumerated by Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawhīd*, 195-9; Fr. trans., 132-5; Eng. trans., 151-3). For when traced back to its authentic expression, to the Revelation and the *Sunna*, Islam is a religion compatible with science and civilization (*Tafsīr* . . . , ix, 23); it encourages progress and science (*ibid.*, iii, 26, 34, 106); and exalts science and freedom of research, which are the conditions of man's greatness (*ibid.*, v, 258); Islam is capable of regenerating civilization in the East and saving that of the West (*ibid.*, ix, 22). What is more:

4.—*Islam is the reforming principle of mankind* (*islāh naw' al-insān*, *Tafsīr*, xi, 206). As a *dīn* and as a *sharī'a*, Islam is a progression beyond previous religions (*ibid.*, 208-88: the enumeration of the various domains in which Islam has been beneficial to mankind). Hence the Muslim duty to reveal the truth of Islam: this is part of the canonical obligation to "invite to Good" (Muḥammad 'Abduh, *Risālat al-tawhīd*, 171; Fr. trans., 116; Eng. trans., 135; *Tafsīr* iv, 26-46, on sūra III, 104) and to "call to God" (Ibn Bādīs, *Shihāb*, April 1935, 6, ref. to sūras XVI, 125 and XII, 108). To call to God, in this case, consists in proclaiming the values of Islam, refuting, through its "proofs", the false ideas ascribed to it, and in making known its "beauties"; all this in order to fortify Muslims in their faith and to enlighten non-Muslims, less perhaps in order to convert them than to dissipate their prejudices and fanaticism. However, the notion of missionary work is not foreign to the reformists (cf. J. Jomier, *Le Comment. Coran. du Manār*, chap. X). Nevertheless, Muḥammad 'Abduh gives priority to the duty of Islamic tolerance over conversion: "Islam is capable, through its own light, of penetrating the hearts of men" (*Risālat al-tawhīd*, 172). In practice, the act of calling to God leads to a certain number of religious, moral and cultural attitudes, towards both Muslims and non-Muslims.

—a. Calling to God consists above all in leading a life that is in perfect agreement with the general commands of Islam. This is the best way to ensure that the influence of the ideals contained in the *Qurʾān* will grow. On a spiritual as well as a moral level, the Prophet's example, and that of the "pious forefathers", must inspire believers: "the more perfect their imitation, the more perfect their accomplishment of the mission of calling to God" (Ibn Bādīs).—b. Preaching the truths contained in the *Qurʾān* and thus helping to transmit the revealed message (*tabligh al-risāla*) is also "calling to God": since this message has universal implications, each part of it must be made comprehensible to all men. This theme can be related to that of the *djihād* through the *Qurʾān* (cf. *Shihāb*, April 1932, 204 ff.): for Ibn Bādīs, this *Qurʾānic* expression seems to justify a militant theology and an energetic conception of religious preaching, both to rouse the masses from their inertia and indifference and to denounce the blindness of "bad religious teachers" (*ʿulamāʾ al-sū*) in the face of the spiritual riches of the Revelation and their reluctance to make them manifest to men.—c. Calling to God also implies the attempt to bring back to the Islamic fold those Muslims who, seduced by secular ideologies or intoxicated with modern scientific knowledge, regard Islam as "a worn-out piece of clothing that a man would be ashamed to be seen wearing", and deride its dogmas and precepts (Muḥammad ʿAbduh, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, 198; Fr. trans., 134-5; Eng. trans., 153).—d. The idea of calling to God also implies a struggle against the corruption (*fasād*) spread in Muslim society in the name of "so-called modernism" (*Tafsīr*, x, 45) and against atheism like that of Kemāl Atatürk (*ibid.*, ix, 322-3); warning against excessive individual freedom, which generates all sorts of abuse (*ibid.*, viii, 530-1) and is more or less directly responsible for the "moral crisis of the West"; enlightening people on the dangers inherent in the separation of science and religion, the cult of science *per se*, and the frantic quest for material goods without any moral goal (*ibid.*, xi, 243).—e. It also means unmasking professional politicians who may not be sincere and practising Muslims, but nevertheless use Islam for demagogic ends, either in subservience to government, or to serve their own personal ambition (*ibid.*, ii, 440). Similar strictures could be passed on recent tendencies to use religious arguments in support of some socio-economic ideology (cf. "Muslim Socialism" to which some theoreticians of "Arab Socialism" refer) or political doctrine (cf. e.g. Khālīd Muḥammad Khālīd, *La Religion au service du peuple*, in *Orient* xx, (1961), 155-61).—f. In opposition to the type of nationalism encouraged by jingoistic modernists, and beyond particular fatherlands, the call to God gives pride of place to the religious link above ethnic and political ones (*ibid.*, ii, 304). It means stressing the fraternity of Islam (*ibid.*, iv, 21) and persuading Muslims that greatness and pride do not lie in the insistence on particularities of race or nationality—that new form of the age-old clan-spirit (*ʿaṣabiyyat al-djāhiliyya*)—but in belonging to the "Islamic human community" (*ibid.*, xi, 256). This is one aspect of the ideology of panislamism (*al-islāmīya* or *al-islāmiyya*) which corresponds to the political and cultural doctrine of the Salafiyya. Since *Djāmāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī* and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, reformist authors have unceasingly called for not only the elimination of doctrinal disagreements above all in matters of the interpretation of religious

Law) between orthodox Schools and even between the Sunnī and Shīʿī worlds, but, by reminding Muslims of their duty to confessional solidarity, they have pleaded the cause of a policy of strengthening political ties and interislamic co-operation. Thus would the unity of the *Umma* be recreated, even if only symbolically, through the mediation of a supreme moral assembly that would represent every Muslim country—for example in the form of the permanent assembly (*djāmāʿat al-muslimīn*) which Ibn Bādīs suggested (cf. A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman*, 376 ff.). Even this would be second best compared with the organic unity of the Community under the banner of one supreme *Imām*, which had been Rashīd Riḍā's dream (cf. his *Khilāfa*; trans. H. Laoust, *Le Califat dans la doctrine de R.R.*).—g. In reply to those who proclaimed the social and cultural values of the West, the reformists exalted the values specific to Islamic ethics, if need be by referring to the "accounts" (*shahādāt*) of Western thinkers who were sensitive to the virtues of Islam and perturbed by the moral degradation that they perceived in the materialist civilization of the Western world (cf. *Tafsīr*, x, 412, 420; xi, 243).

Reformist apologetics reveal the attitude of the Salafiyya in the face of two realities: on the one hand the material and cultural seduction of Muslim intellectual élites and ruling classes by the West; and on the other the modernists' attempt at a systematic renewal of Muslim society so that it could face, as immediately and effectively as possible, the necessities of modern life. It is thus not simply a defensive reaction against, or even rejection of, certain aspects of western civilization, but a way of replying to Muslims who believed in progress and modernism (*tadjiḍīd*) and who wanted to look for a compromise between the fundamental demands of Islam and the necessary adaptation of Muslim life to the realities of the modern world.

The apologetic work of the Salafiyya was not simply episodic, for it demanded that they make an effort to understand their adversaries' point of view and develop a measure of cultural open-mindedness (often, it is true, timid), and sometimes led them to moderate those aspects of their theological and moral doctrine which might have seemed too fundamentalist. But at the same time it revealed the diversity of their temperaments and attitudes in the face of practical problems, especially when they had gone beyond discussing the place of absolute fidelity to the two sources in the liturgical and dogmatic spheres, and to the tradition of the Salaf in the general ethics of Islam. Apart from the more or less favourable historical and cultural conjuncture, the success of *islāh* in the different parts of the Arab world has been linked, to some extent, to the way in which the Salafiyya have been able to cope with the concrete problems facing Muslim society as a result of its progressive entry into the social, economic, technical and cultural norms of the modern world.

D.—İŞLÂH IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB WORLD.—At the end of almost a century of development, we can assess the ground covered by the Salafiyya reformist movement from the time of *al-ʿUrwa al-wuthqā* (1884) to the present day; at this moment the Arab world is the scene of important debates on the methods of interpreting the *Qurʾān* and the authenticity of *Ḥadīth* on the one hand, and the function and autonomy of religion on the other. This is particularly true in countries in which research and cultural activity are more or less "orientated" toward—if not "mobilized" in the service of—politic-

al and social objectives that are held to be sacred, and in which national energy is often geared primarily toward social reorganization and economic construction in an attempt to overcome underdevelopment. The development of *islâh* in a changing Arab world can be divided into three important stages:

1. — *The heroic stage*, during which Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh and ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibī laid the essential foundations of a total reform of Islam (cf. the programme defined in *Umm al-ḥurā*). Reformist action during this period aimed above all at the material and moral improvement of the Community, which had barely emerged from the Middle Ages. The social, political and cultural demands made by the three leaders of modern *islâh* had more effect than their doctrinal intervention (with the exception of Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s *Risālat al-tawḥīd* which is a sort of guide for a basic theology). The reformists’ written and oral propaganda thus contributed to the Community’s growing awareness of notions of evolution, progress and creative effort (*idjtiḥād*) on a spiritual and practical plane. It is true that the cultural climate of the period—end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century—was favourable to the adoption of these ideas in Muslim thought, for this was the era of scientism, the optimism brought about by technical progress, and the growth of the idea that efficiency was an essential element of economic prosperity and social success. Yet the function of the Salafiyya was to confer on these notions—and at first the idea of *idjtiḥād*—a legitimacy that would satisfy the *Umma*, by assimilating them to authentic principles of Islam (seen from an ethical and cultural angle). In its initial form the reformist current of contemporary Islam hastened the birth of Arabo-Muslim awareness of the modern world, but also gave rise to aspirations (of a socio-cultural nature etc.) and questions which the succeeding Muslim generation had to face.

2. — *The second stage* (approximately 1905 to 1950).—This period saw the emergence of a doctrinal system in which Raḥīd Riḍā and ṣayyikh Ibn Bādīs played a vital part. The example of these two strong personalities inspired writers whose numerous essays (in reviews like *al-Manār*, *al-Shihāb*, *Maḍjallat al-shubbān al-muslimīn*, *al-Risāla*, *al-Maḍjalla al-sayyūniyya*) enriched the thought of *islâh* and consolidated its doctrinal positions. The principal reformist authors during the first half of the 20th century will now be briefly examined.

a) In Syria Djamāl al-Dīn al-Kāsimī (1866/7-1914) was a faithful disciple of the neo-Hanbali tradition. His compatriot Ṭāhir al-Djazā’irī (1851-1919) put his vast erudition at the disposal of *islâh* (notably in the publishing field).—‘Abd al-Kādir al-Maghribī (1867-1956), who in his youth was influenced by direct contact with Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, made a very fruitful contribution to *islâh* in Syria.—Shakīb Arslān (1869-1946) a brilliant writer (called *amir al-bayān*, “Prince of Eloquence”) and politician, was a firm believer in Arabism (cf. his monthly revue, *La Nation Arabe*, Geneva 1930-9); a personal acquaintance of the editor of *al-Manār*, he made a greatly appreciated contribution to that review.—Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī (1876-1953), ex-president of the Arab Academy at Damascus (1920-53), although not properly speaking a reformist author, was a firm believer in Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s ideas and can be counted among the literary and political personalities of the Arab world whose moral support of *islâh* was greatly valued.

b) In Egypt there were many “spiritual sons”

of Muḥammad ‘Abduh, who were more or less faithful to the original ideas of their master: Muḥammad Farīd Waḡḡdī (1875-1954), the author of a ḡur’ānic commentary with concordist tendencies, was the energetic editor of the review *al-Risāla* (founded in 1933) and a fervent propagandist for Islam.—Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-Marāḡhī (1881-1945) was twice (1928, 1935) principal of al-Azhar, where he contributed to the spread of reformist ideals and struggled to strengthen the links between the orthodox schools; he attempted reforms in the spirit of Muḥammad ‘Abduh, of whom he was a worthy successor.—Maḥmūd Ṣhaltūt (1893-1963): another grand master of al-Azhar (cf. *Djama’at al-taḡrīb bayn al-maḡhāhib* and his trimestrial revue *Risālat al-Islām*, Cairo, 1949-). —Aḥmad Amīn (1886-1954), author of an immense fresco of Islamic culture and history (*Faḍīr*, *Duḡā* and *Zuḥr al-Islām*), was one of the principal artisans of the Arab-Islamic cultural renewal to which the promoters of modern *islâh* aspired. By his teaching and his writing (cf. his revue *al-Thaḡāfa*, Cairo 1939), he attempted, like Muḥammad ‘Abduh, to guide Muslim thought towards a doctrine that was a sort of neo-Mu’tazilism.

c) In Tunisia the main representatives of orthodox reformist thought were Baṣṣīr Ṣfar (d. in 1937), the much respected teacher of Ibn Bādīs, the two ṣayyikhs Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir b. ‘Āṣḥūr (born in 1879)—author of a ḡur’ānic commentary (now being published, i-iii, Tunis 1956-71)—and his son Muḥammad al-Fāḍil b. ‘Āṣḥūr (1900-1970) (cf. Muḥammad al-Fāḍil b. ‘Āṣḥūr: *al-Haraka al-adabiyya wa’l-fikriyya fi Tūnis*, Cairo 1956).

d) In Algeria, besides Ibn Bādīs, notable reformists were Mubārak al-Millī (1890-1945), the theologian of the Algerian reformist school (see *Bibli.*); Ṭayyib al-‘Uḡbī (1888-1962), a supporter of *islâh* who was greatly influenced by Wahhābī tendencies (he had spent his childhood in the Ḥiḍjāz), and owned a newspaper, *al-Islāh* (Biskra 1927-) which appeared irregularly; Muḥammad al-Baṣṣīr al-Ibrāhīmī (1889-1965) [see AL-IBRĀHĪMĪ]; Aḥmad Tawfīk al-Madānī (born in 1899), historian and politician, who was very active in the cause of Algerian national culture in the context of the reformist movement.

e) In Morocco, where the orthodox reformism of the Salafiyya was diffused at a relatively late date, few important names and works emerged (cf. J. Berque, *Ça et là dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maroc*, in *Etudes... dédiées à la mémoire d’E. Lévi-Provençal*, Paris 1962, ii, 471-94).

Amongst the representative personalities of *islâh* in the Sherifian empire, we might mention: Abū Ṣḥu‘ayb al-Dukkālī (d. 1937); Ibn al-Muwakkīt (1894-1949), who was more interested in censuring public morality than any real renewal of Islam (cf. the art. by A. Faure on Ibn al-Muwakkīt in *Hesperis*, 1952, 165-95); ‘Allāl al-Fāṣī (born in 1910), a writer and political leader (Independence Party, *ḥizb al-istiḡlāl*) who claims to be a Salafī (cf. his *Autocritique*, *al-Nakd al-ḡhāṣī*, Cairo 1952).

These various authors would seem to be continuators of the doctrinal and pedagogic work of the first teachers of *islâh*. It is nevertheless worth noting that numerous writers and poets, such as Ḥāfiḡ Ibrāhīm (1872-1932), Muṣṭafā Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī (1876-1924), ‘Abbās Maḥmūd al-Aḡḡād (1889-1964), Muḥammad al-‘Id (born in 1904) etc., indirectly helped to spread *islâh* by employing its moral and social themes in their works.

Despite its undeniable fertility (which Brockelmann only partially describes in S III, 310-35, 435-6), the

fifty-year-long work of the reformists brought no solutions which satisfied the problems of all social classes within the Community. Their doctrines—social and political as well as theological and moral—seemed to correspond more closely to the aspirations of the newly emergent urban middle class. As a group, it was relatively enlightened, and sometimes combined a minimum Arab-Islamic culture with a gloss of modern culture in one of the European languages. It wished to demonstrate its allegiance to a particular form of tradition—that of the Salaf as defined above—and at the same time to show a certain interest in things modern. The ideals of this class were expressed in terms of moderation and compromise; in the religious sphere they sought "reasonable" positions that excluded popular traditionalism (which they saw as the sign of ignorance or a reactionary spirit), as well as intransigent fundamentalism (represented by certain Muslim Brothers [*al-ikhwān al-muslimūn* (q.v.)]). They also rejected modernism which they judged excessive (such as the advocacy of a completely secular state). The orthodox reformism of the Salafiyya was thus assured of a fairly wide public which believed in order and prudent evolution, which respected the moral authority of the religious leaders, and was convinced that the Community needed "guides" to take it along the road of a progress that would be compatible with reformist faith. But the apparently harmonious development of *islāh* was to suffer from the political upheavals and social and moral changes resulting from the Second World War.

3. — *Recent developments (since the '50s)*.—The post-war period marked the beginning of a complete change in the religious make-up of the Arab world. The make-up of the reformist camp underwent profound qualitative and quantitative changes. The spokesmen of *islāh* were no longer of the calibre of Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) or 'Abd al-Hāmid b. Bādīs (d. 1940), and at the same time the Muslim Brothers movement came to the forefront. It attracted attention by means of political action and through the doctrinal works of several remarkable personalities, like Ḥasan Ismā'īl al-Huḍaybī, leading guide and successor of Ḥasan al-Bannā (q.v.); Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, a publicist of Syrian origin, ex-director of al-Maṭba'a al-Salafiyya (in Cairo); the Syrian Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī (d. 1965); Sayyid Kuṭb (executed in 1966), author of a Qur'anic commentary, *Fī ṣilāl al-Qur'ān*; Muḥammad al-Ḥazālī, whose apologetic and doctrinal works amount to more than 7,000 pp. (cf. *REI, Abstracta*, 1961, 105-6); and Sa'īd Ramaḍān, founder and still editor of the revue *al-Muslimūn* (Cairo-Damascus, 1951-; Geneva, 1961-).—b. The reformist movement lost that place in society which was its strength between the wars: the supporters of the main current of *islāh* (in direct line from Rashīd Riḍā, for example) were quickly regarded as inheritors and supporters of a moral and social order already described as "traditional"—c. Paradoxically, the historical success of the reformist movement—in Algeria and, up to a point, in Egypt—contributed to its disintegration and fall. Attracted by power (and some actually absorbed into public office), many missionaries of *islāh* abandoned their former zeal for the triumph of Islamic values and settled for a prudent opportunism. Forced by events to supply "official" religion with structures and a doctrine, they in their turn became a conformist force. The defence of pure Islam, which had been the aim of *islāh* in opposition, was taken up by men who were enemies of any compromise with regimes which they held to be unjust or illegal, the same men whom

their opponents happily called fascist or reactionary.—d. The younger generation, less and less restricted by the ability to speak Arabic only, succeeded in discovering a new vision of social and moral realities around the world (through the cinema, the illustrated press, and foreign literature); new philosophies (cf. the success of Existentialism after the War and the increasing dissemination of Marxism—which followed Communist penetration—in Arab countries); new more or less revolutionary ideologies (anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, Arab Socialism and unity); and a new political ethic inspired by the "Spirit of Bandung" (1955). All these factors made the young generation sceptical about the virtues of *islāh* and doubtful of its fundamental principles, principles which had seemed as satisfying to the mind as they were reassuring to the faith of the preceding generation.—e. The rise to power of new social forces in the newly independent countries (Syria-Lebanon: 1946; Libya: 1952; Sudan: 1955; Morocco and Tunisia: 1956; Algeria: 1962), or those whose monarchies were supplanted by republican regimes (Egypt: 1952; Irāk: 1958; Tunisia: 1957; Libya: 1969), relegated to the background the notables and national bourgeoisie, who had held power in the shadow of the previous regime. In taking over the apparatus of state, the younger generation naturally sought to extend its power to different sectors of public opinion, in order to gain control of the "national orientation". As a result, religion, wooed to an increasing extent by politics, found itself involved in a struggle—if not in a "revolution"—whose objectives were beyond its scope. Religious leaders (*muftīs*, *ulamā'*) can hardly constitute an independent class, as they did in the past, which formulates doctrines (for example about political ethics) in the name of an ideal Islam and independently of the ideology in power, or of its directives.—f. In those Arab societies engaged in a process of political liberation and social and economic transformation, *islāh* ceased to be a reformist and progressive ideology. Its doctrinal positions on social and economic matters seemed out of date. Its calls for constant meditation of the Qur'ān as a source of inspiration for Muslims, in both their private and their public acts, went unheeded by young people, who were presented by modern states with more important (and in some ways obligatory) terms of reference in the form of programmes, charters, etc. The tradition of the Salaf, which *islāh* attempted to present in an exalted light, was received by the young people without enthusiasm. For them concrete reality with its social, professional and material problems, the collective tasks it imposes, the needs that it creates (for consumer goods, leisure etc.), the amusements it offers (entertainment, sport, travel) was much more important. Reflecting the moral and aesthetic aspirations of their age, young people preferred to seek happiness in this world rather than to aim at the reformist goal of felicity in this world and the next. In its values and in the problems it posed, *islāh* gave the appearance of being out of harmony with the rising generation, who tended to see economic, political and cultural problems as more important than ethical and spiritual ones. The younger generation willingly identified with the principles of liberalism and secularism, seeing them the ideal guiding forces of human relations and life in Muslim society today. If young people considered religion at all, it was as a secondary factor in the political strategy of the regime, especially applicable in questions of the civic and political education of the masses and as a means of sanctifying national unity. *Islāh* was thus often

invoked in support of official ideology, not for the religious values it represented or for its references to Islamic authenticity.

This complex of phenomena which has become apparent throughout the Arab world over the last few decades clearly shows two things: the striking weakening of *islâh* as a "driving force" in Muslim society, and its replacement by politics, which is now becoming the moving spirit on every level of national life. Politics is the most important factor of life today, for, considerably helped by the mass media and propaganda techniques, it seizes public attention, concentrating it on the acts of its rulers; in this way the life of a whole nation hangs on the "historic" speeches and oracular utterances of national leaders, those heroes and demi-gods of modern times. (Thus it is that it is possible to talk of the charisma of such and such an Arab chief of state who has become idolized by the masses). Political language itself has acquired such prominence over other forms of expression (literature, religion, etc.) that it impregnates them with its concepts and its dialectic. (In many cases the religious vocabulary seems to be nothing more than the simple transposition of the political). New powers—the state, the party—have taken over the primary role in the life of the *Umma*, and have directed its social and cultural orientations. Sometimes these powers, armed with totalitarian might, try to force the citizen's duties and beliefs on him. From this moment, religion ceased to be the most important factor in Muslim life and found itself dispossessed of its traditional function as interpreter of symbols and record of the community's conscience.

In this social and cultural context, the voice of *islâh* lost much of its strength and effectiveness. The reformist public itself moved in the direction of modernism and atheism or became reformist groups whose concept of the role of *islâh* in the modern world differed from that held by the Salafiyya. Such tendencies seem to be the logical result of the ideas implicit in the two main strands of reformist thought since the beginning of the 20th century—the liberal trend, which favoured a global realignment of Muslim life to the modern world, and a strictly orthodox current that hoped to preserve the initial message of Islam in its entirety within contemporary civilization, despite all opposition and obstacles.

1.—The liberal tendency was already latent in several authors of the inter-war period. Claiming more or less explicitly to be the heirs to the spirit—if not the religious thinking—of Muḥammad 'Abduh, they had some success after the war, during a period in which the differences between reformism and modernism made themselves felt more and more acutely. The *de facto* separation of political and religious affairs resulting from the institutional and cultural development of many Arab (and Muslim) countries—a development influenced by a certain liberal spirit—led some people to examine Islamic problems and subjects which until then had been taboo. This sort of free inquiry no longer exposed them to the vengeance of the administration or to persecution at the hands of conservative religious and university circles, as had been the case for 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq in 1925, and Ṭāhir al-Ḥaddād in 1930. (Some delicate problems like the nature and mode of interpretation of the *Kur'ān* or the authenticity of *Ḥadīth* nevertheless continued to provoke violent arguments between orthodox 'ulamā' and avant-garde representatives of Muslim thought (cf., for example, J. Jomier, *Quelques positions actuelles de l'exégèse coranique en Égypte* . . . (1947-51), in *MIDEO* (1954), 39-72, on the subject of

a thesis by Muḥammad Aḥmad Khālaf Allāh, *Al-Fann al-ḥaṣaṣī fī 'l-Kur'ān al-karīm*, Cairo 1951). The idea of a social and cultural modernism that would respect personal belief was gradually accepted. This liberalism included matters of political organization, but attempted to reform traditional teaching to eliminate those aspects of religion that were holding back the evolution of Muslim society. On the religious plane, this trend supported a more flexible interpretation of the Scriptures, which, while satisfying reason and the scientific spirit, would permit the resolution of difficulties arising between practical life and the principles of the *shari'a*, as they were formulated by traditional orthodoxy and taken over by the Salafiyya. Taken to its logical conclusion, this trend is identical to secular modernism, which had once been combatted vigorously by Rashīd Riḍā, Ibn Bādīs and their respective schools.

2.—At the same time, the partisans of energetic reformism, worried by the success of secular tendencies and by the growth of laxity in Muslim society, reacted in the direction of an Islamic renewal on the part of the individual and the state. By reinvigorating the doctrinal positions of moderate *islâh*, they provided sympathizers and followers for the Muslim Brothers, whose fundamental principles (discounting the political activism of some of them) are very close to the strict orthodoxy professed by the Salafiyya (cf. the brief account of their doctrine by the first supreme guide of the Muslim Brothers, Ḥasan al-Bannā' (1906-1949 [q.v.] in his pamphlet: *Ilā ayy shay' nad'u 'l-nās?*, Cairo, 1939 (?). Because it attempted to restore Islamic values in their original purity, and gave the appearance of deliberately ignoring the new values of modern culture and civilization, this trend did not gain the sympathy of either the modernists—fervent defenders of social and cultural liberalism and freedom of conscience—nor that of the young who were still attached to Islam, but aware of the social and political changes taking place around them. Fully committed to the "logic of history" and hoping to avoid both the ambiguities of a reformism that was not progressive enough for them and the intransigent fundamentalism of the religious movements, which they felt to be reactionary, the young opted for a populist *islâh*, and, taking the part of the mass of the population which previous regimes had for so long ignored, fought for social justice (one of the dominant themes in the politico-religious literature of the post-war years; cf. Sayyid Ḥuṭb, *Al-'adāla al-idjtimā'iyya fī 'l-Islām*, Cairo 1952; Eng. trans. J. H. Hardie, *Social Justice in Islam*, Washington 1953). They pleaded for the socialization of culture (cf. the Egyptian "Cultural Library", aimed at the popularization of science and making it accessible to the common people). They attempted to establish a new Arabo-Islamic humanism, based on a socialist state which would put an end to exploitation and oppression, without itself employing terror (cf. in this respect the principles set down by one of the theorists of Arab Socialism (*Ba'ṭh*), Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Bayṭār, *Al-Siyāsa al-'arabiyya bayn al-mabda' wa 'l-taḥbīk*, Beirut 1960; Fr. trans. by Marcel Colombe, in *Orient*, xl (1966), 173 ff.). Finally the reformist writers of this avant-garde group refused to adhere not only to social and political forms that they considered to be decisively condemned by History, but also to collective representations and ideas that they felt were the product of a medieval mentality. On the other hand, to the extent that they express, in the language of our day, something that is essential to the *kur'ānic*

message, they attempted to integrate with Muslim thought the leading concepts of contemporary culture (notably in relation to the Third World), even in the case of ideas that are the product of nominally atheistic ideologies such as socialism (*ishtirākīyya* [q.v.]) and the revolution (*thawra* [q.v.]).

In conclusion, even though *islāḥ* no longer appears to be a religious and cultural current with the force, homogeneity and unity of tone that it had had in the inter-war period, it continues to evolve different forms, some vehement, others more moderate. Whether we consider the liberal *islāḥ* of the moderate intellectuals who claimed for Islam tolerance and freedom of investigation, preached the emancipation of peoples through education and instruction, and based their optimistic vision of human evolution on the triumph of Reason and Science; or the militant *islāḥ* of the Muslim Brothers, with their mystique of fidelity to the Muḥammadan mission and their desire to give Islam an effective presence in the world; or the *islāḥ* of the idealistic youth, expressed in "left-wing" terms and motivated by a desire for social justice and political morality; each of these trends represents one of the fundamental options preached by Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad 'Abduh, and 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, and carried on by their faithful followers in the East and in the Maghrib.

At a time when cultures interact more rapidly than ever before, when the spirit of oecumenism is developing not merely in a Christian context, Muslim reformism could no longer remain enclosed within the static universe of the Salafiyya. By the very diversity of its current trends *islāḥ* can escape from the rigid dogmatism which always haunts monolithic movements. In this way *islāḥ* becomes the meeting-ground where many thinkers and university teachers who feel personally concerned with the future of Islam in the modern world can attempt to give Islamic culture a "new start". This has given rise to a proliferation of essays and critical works, claiming to be inspired by *islāḥ*, everywhere in the Arab world (Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia etc.), and even in Pakistan, where the ideas of Muḥammad Iqbal, for example, continue to be a fertile source of inspiration.

Bibliography: 1. Background: C. Brockelmann, S III, 310-55; F. M. Pareja et al., *Islamologie*, Beirut 1957-63, 724-43; H. Laoust, *Le Réformisme orthodoxe des "Salafiyya" et les caractères généraux de son orientation actuelle*, in *REI*, 1932, 175-224; Ch. C. Adam, *Islam and modernism in Egypt*, London 1933, (reprinted American University at Cairo, 1968); H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern trends in Islam*, Chicago 1947 (on reformist and modernist trends); A. Hourani, *Arabic thought in the Liberal Age—1798-1939*, Oxford 1962; L. Gardet, *La Cité musulmane*, Paris 1954, 3 1969 (especially *Annexe III*); Muḥammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of religious thought in Islam*, Oxford 1934.

2. Historical account of modern *islāḥ*: a) The neo-Ḥanbalī influence: basic ref. H. Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḥī-D-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taymiyya*, Cairo 1939, 541-75.—b) The Wahhābī antecedents: H. Laoust, *Essai*... 506-40; 615-30, Bibliogr. 648-51; L. Massignon, *Les vraies origines dogmatiques du Wahhabisme*... in *RMM*, xxxvi (1918-19), 320 ff.; WAHHĀBIYA, in *EI*¹; Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, in *EI*¹.

3. The main representatives of the modern reformist trend: a vast quantity of literature treats the subject from a general point of view. Cf.: Aḥmad Amin, *Zu'ama' al-islāḥ fi 'l-ʿaṣr*

al-ḥadīth, Cairo 1368/1949 (on ten reformist personalities of the Arab world and the Indian sub-continent). Special studies: a) Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897): *EI*², s.v.; Brockelmann, S III, 311-5; Aḥ. Amin, *Zu'ama' al-islāḥ*... 59-120; Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn "al-Afghānī": a political biography*, Los Angeles 1972; E. Kedourie, *Afghani and 'Abduh*, London 1966; Honia Pakdaman, *Djamāl ed-Dīn Assad Abādī dit Afghani*, Paris 1960, Bibliogr. 369-82 (tends to demystify the character by underlining the weakness in the man). Complementary study: A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, *Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī. An annotated Bibliography*, Leiden 1970.—b) 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (1854?-1902): Brockelmann, S III, 380; R. Riḍā, *Muṣāb'azim*... (In memoriam), in *al-Manār*, v (1902), 237-40, 276-80; Aḥ. Amin, *Zu'ama' al-islāḥ*... 249-79; Muḥ. Aḥ. Khalaf Allāh, *Al-K., ḥayātuh wa-āthārūh*, Cairo 1962; Khaldūn S. al-Ḥuṣrī, *Three Reformers*, Beirut 1966, 55-112.—c) Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849-1905): *EI*¹, s.v.; Brockelmann, S III, 315-21; the basic ref. still remains: R. Riḍā, *Ta'riḫ al-ustādh al-imām al-shaykh M. 'A.*, 3 vols. Cairo, i, 1350/1931 (essentially biographical, with autobiographical notes by Muḥ. 'Abduh, 20-5), ii, 1344/1925 (list of works and diverse writings), iii, 1324/1906 (funerary orations; obituary notices); H. Laoust, *Essai*... 542 ff.; Aḥ. Amin, *Zu'ama' al-islāḥ*... 281-338; J. Jomier, *Le Comment. coran. du Manār*, chap. I. The personality of Muḥ. 'Abduh has been the object of numerous studies, unequal in interest and often in the nature of an apologia (cf. 'Abbās Maḥmūd al-'Akkād, *'Abḥarī al-islāḥ wa 'l-ta'lim al-ustādh al-imām Muḥ. 'Abduh*, Cairo n.d.). A general bibliogr. on the life, work and thought of Muḥ. 'Abduh still remains to be compiled.—d) Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935): Brockelmann, S III, 321-3; autobiographical notes in his *al-Manār wa 'l-azhar*, 129-200; Ṣhākīb Arslān, *al-Sayyid R.R. aw ikhā' arba'in sana*, Damascus 1356/1937; H. Laoust, *Essai*... 557 ff.; J. Jomier, *Le Comment. coran. du Manār*, chap. I.—e) 'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Bādīs (1889-1940). *EI*², s.v.; A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940*, 79-86 and *Index*; idem, *Ibn Bādīs, Commentateur du Coran*, Paris 1971.—f) On secondary characters whose names are still linked to the history of the reformist trend in contemporary history, see above (D).

4. Works on doctrine. We will restrict ourselves here to the major works. For the rest, see the refs. mentioned in the article. a) Afghānī and Muḥ. 'Abduh, *al-'Urwa al-wuthkū*, Beirut 1328/1910, (new ed., Cairo 1958); Fr. trans. Marcel Colombe, *Pages choisies de Dj. al-D. al-A.*, in *Orient*, xxi-xxiv (1962), and xxv (1963).—b) Afghānī, *Ḥaḳīqat-i madḥhab-i naysharī wa-bayān-i ḥāl-i nayshariyān* (directed against Aḥmad Khān [q.v.]), Ḥaydarābād 1298/1880 (Arabic trans. by the author, same date and place); another Arabic version, based on the original Persian, by Muḥ. 'Abduh: *Risālat al-radd 'ala 'l-dahriyyin*, Beirut 1303/1886, then Cairo 1321/1903 (Fr. trans. based on the Arabic text): A. M. Goichon, *Réfutation des Matérialistes*, Paris 1944; (Eng. trans. based on the original Persian): Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism—Polit. and Relig. Writings of Sayyid J. al-D. "al-Afghānī"*, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1968.—c) 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, *Umm al-ḥurā*, [Cairo 1899], fragments in *al-Manār*, v (1902), Cairo 1350/1931, Aleppo

1959: this little work gives a summarized form of all the main themes of reformist propaganda to be developed by R. Riḍā and Ibn Bādīs.—d) Idem, *Ṭabāʾiʿ al-istibdād*, Cairo 1318/1900, enlarged re-ed., Aleppo 1957. This essay was to have less impact in reformist circles than the preceding work.—e) Muḥ. ʿAbduḥ, *Risālat al-tawḥīd*, Cairo, 1315/1897; new ed. (expurgated as far as the question of the "created Qurʾān" is concerned), with notes, by R. Riḍā, Cairo 1326/1908. This ed. was considered as definitive for more than half a century (17th. reprint 1379/1960). A new ed. by Maḥmūd Abū Rayya uses the text of the original ed. revised and corrected by the author, Cairo, Maʿārif, 1966). Fr. trans. based on the 1st. ed. by B. Michel and Moustapha Abdel Razik, *Rissalat al-Tawhid—Exposé de la religion musulmane*, Paris 1925; Eng. trans.: [Ishāq] Musaʿad and K. Cragg, *The Theology of Unity*, London 1966.—f) Idem, *Hāshiya ʿalā sharḥ al-Dawānī li ʿl-ʿaḳāʾid al-ʿaḳudiyya*, Cairo 1292/1875; re-ed. in Sulaymān Dunyā, *Al-shaykh, M. ʿA. bayn al-falāsifa wa-l-kalāmiyyin*, Cairo 1377/1958, 2 vols. In the Introduction (64 pp.) the ed. situates the thought of M. ʿA. in relation to the problems of faith and reason, and criticizes the "excessive" rationalism of ʿAbduḥ. For the same sort of approach note his *Risālāt al-wāridāt* (written in 1294/1877), 1st ed., Cairo 1299/1882. According to R. Riḍā the author reconsidered, towards the end of his life, a large part of his youthful work (which deals with *kalām*, Ṣūfism and the *falsafa*).—g) Idem, *Al-Islām wa ʿl-Naṣrāniyya maʿa ʿl-ʿilm wa ʿl-madaniyya*, Cairo 1320/1902 (replies and apologetic refutations).—h) Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Kurʾān al-ḥakīm al-shahīr bi-Tafsīr al-Manār*, in 12 vols., Cairo 1346-53/1927-34 (this commentary stops at verse 52, sūrah XII, and thus only covers 2/5 of the Qurʾānic text).—i) Idem, *Taʾrīkh al-ustādḥ al-imām al-Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAbduḥ* (see above, 3, c).—j) Idem, *Al-Khilāfa aw al-imāma al-ʿuẓmā*, Cairo 1341/1922-23 (Fr. trans. H. Laoust, *Le califat dans la doctrine de R.R.*, Beirut 1938).—k) Idem, *al-Manār wa ʿl-azhar*, Cairo 1353/1934 (polemics with the conservative circles at *al-Azhar*). Many pamphlets which gather together the art. extracted from *Manār*, above all: 1) *Al-Waḥda al-Islāmiyya wa ʿl-ukhuwwa al-dīniyya*, Cairo 1346/1928 (on the themes of *taḳlīd* and *idjtiḥād*).—m) ʿAbd al-Ḥamid b. Bādīs, *Madjālīs al-taḍḥīr min kalām al-ḥakīm al-khaḍīr*, part. published with *Introd.* by M. B. Ibrāhīmī, by Ahmed Bouchemāl, Constantine 1948, 96 pp.; complete, but not critical ed., by Muḥ. Šāliḥ Ramaḍān and ʿAbd Allāh Šāhīn, Cairo 1384/1964, 496 pp.—n) Mubārak al-Millī, *Risālat al-shirk wa-maḥāhirih*, Constantine 1356/1937 (a theologic-moral work strongly influenced by Wahhābī doctrine).—o) M. al-Baṣṣir al-Ibrāhīmī, *ʿUyūn al-Baṣāʾir*, Cairo 1963 (editorials from the paper *al-Baṣāʾir*, Algiers 1947-56, on questions of relig., soc., polit., and culture, in pure reformist tradition).—p) Maḥmūd Shaltūt, *al-Islām ʿaḳīda wa-sharīʿa*, Cairo n.d. [1959].—q) Principal reformist papers and revues: *al-Manār* (monthly, Cairo, 1898-1935; ed. Rashīd Riḍā); *al-Faṭḥ* (weekly, Cairo, founded in 1926; ed. Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb); *Madjallat al-shubbān al-muslimīn* (monthly, Cairo, founded in 1928; organ of the *Society of Young Muslims*); *al-Shihāb* (Constantine, 1925-39; monthly from 1927 on; ed. Ibn Bādīs); *al-Baṣāʾir* (weekly, Algiers 1936-9; ed. Ṭayyib al-ʿUḳbī; new series. 1947-56; ed. Baṣṣir Ibrāhīmī).

5. Analytical and critical studies: Besides the names of Muḥ. Iḳbāl, H. Laoust, H. A. R. Gibb, L. Gardet, J. Jomier, quoted above, cf.: I. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*, Leiden 1920, repr. 1970 (Arab trans. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Nadjdjār, *Madhāhib al-tafsīr al-Islāmī*, Cairo 1374/1955; The Introduction to the Fr. trans. of *Risālat al-tawḥīd* (p. IX-LXXXV); Osman Amin, Muḥ. ʿAbduḥ: *Essai sur ses idées philos. et relig.*, Cairo 1944 (Eng. trans., Ch. Wendell, *Muḥammad ʿAbduḥ*, Washington 1953. Cf. the corrections made to this trans. by Fr. Rosenthal in *JAOS*, lxxiv (1954), 101-2); idem, *Rāʾid al-fikr al-miṣrī*, M. ʿA., Cairo 1955 (enlarged version of preceding title); R. Caspar, *Le Renouveau du Moʿtazilisme*, in *MIDEO*, iv (1957), 141-202 (very thorough study, indispensable ref. on the question); P. Rondot, *L'Islam et les Musulmans d'aujourd'hui*, Paris, i (1968), ii (1960) (work of popularization based on personal experience); J. Berque, J.-P. Charnay and others, *Normes et valeurs de l'Islam contemporain*, Paris 1966 (some interesting judgements on reformist currents of Muslim thought in the 20th C.); M. Kerr, *Islamic Reform (The Polit. and Legal Theories of Muḥ. ʿAbduḥ and R. Riḍā)*, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1966 (underlines certain contradictions in reformist thought); A. Merad, *Le Réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940* (Book II, p. 211-432, is an examination of the doctrine); idem, *Ibn Bādīs, Commentateur du Coran* (thematic analysis of the Qurʾānic commentary of the *Shihāb*).

6. Periodicals which frequently deal with the problems of reformism in an Arab context: *L'Afrique et l'Asie*; *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*; *IBLA*; *Islamic Culture*; *JAOS*; *MIDEO*; *Orient*; *OM*; the old *Revue du Monde Musulman*; the *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* and its *Abstracta*, etc. (A. MERAD)

ii.—IRAN

Islamic thought and expression bearing a distinctively modern stamp has been of less quantity and importance in Iran than either the Arab lands or the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. No figure has emerged comparable in influence or literary output to, for example, Sayyid Kuṭb or Muḥammad Iḳbāl [q.v.]. This may be attributed in part to the relative isolation of Iran from intellectual currents in other parts of the Muslim world by virtue of its profession of Shīʿism, and in part, too, to the very nature of Shīʿism, which being in its essence an esoterism, is less susceptible to those storms of historical change that have provoked modernist reaction elsewhere. Traditional learning and institutions have, moreover, been unusually well preserved in Iran, and while Islamic modernism in other lands has frequently arisen from "lay" impatience with ʿulamā attitudes to the faith and a desire to expound and implement its dictates independently of them, the Iranian ʿulamā have, by contrast, maintained a high degree of influence and prestige. There have nonetheless been certain currents of modernist expression in Iran, elicited in large part by the western impact and tending to the presentation of Islam above all in terms of social and political reform and compatibility with modern science and rationality.

The beginnings of such expression are to be traced to the reign of Faṭḥ ʿAlī Shāh (1797-1834), when the crown prince ʿAbbās Mirzā invoked Qurʾānic sanction for the introduction of certain military reforms of western provenance. The depiction of social and